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There is no getting around it: valuing young startups is unavoidably difficult.1
Unicorns2 and other high-flying startups get the press, but every startup must first launch
and grow. The US startup market cannot flourish unless young startups survive and
develop into highly successful companies. Most young startups need outside capital to get
through their early stages (commonly referred to as “seed investing” or “seed financing”)
but finding willing investors can be challenging.3 Young startups’ valuation difficulties
are a major factor because reasonable investors are less likely to invest when they cannot
confidently value an opportunity.4
Partly in response to the valuation challenge, specialized startup investors—such as
venture capital firms, angels, and accelerators5 (collectively, “Specialized Startup
Investors”)—evolved how they contract for seed investments.6 Historically, they invested
in young-startups by buying stock.7 However, in the mid-2000s, Specialized Startup
Investors started using deferred-equity investment contracts (or deferred-equity
instruments) as an alternative to stock. It began with convertible notes around 2005, 8
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1. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, D ISTRESSED, AND
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 11 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter DARK SIDE OF VALUATION].
2. “A unicorn is a term used in the venture capital industry to describe a privately held startup company with
a value of over $1 billion.” James Chen, Unicorns, I NVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unicorn.asp.
3. Jeffrey Sohl, The Changing Nature of the Angel Market, in 2 HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON VENTURE
CAPITAL: A GLOBALIZING I NDUSTRY 17, 21–22 (Hans Landström & Colin Mason eds., 2012).
4. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION: SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR I NVESTMENT AND
CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter D AMODARAN ON VALUATION] (“Knowing what an asset is
worth and what determines that value is a prerequisite for intelligent decision making—in choosing investments
for a portfolio, in deciding on the appropriate price to pay or receive in a takeover, and in making investment,
financing, and dividend choices when running a business . . . . A postulate of sound investing is that an investor
does not pay more for an asset than it is worth.”).
5. Venture capital firms, angels, and accelerators are defined in infra Part I.
6. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
133, 133–34, 160–62 (2014) [hereinafter Coyle & Green (2014)].
7. Id. at 146–51, 154; John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, The SAFE, the KISS, and the Note: A Survey of
Startup Seed Financing Contracts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 42, 43–44 (2018) [hereinafter Coyle & Green (2018)].
8. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 136; J. Brad Bernthal, The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance:
A New Typology, 2018 B.Y.U. L. REV. 773, 804 (2018).
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followed by the simple agreement for future equity (the “safe”)9 in 2013,10 and the Keep
It Simple Security (the “KISS”) in 2014.11 Each of these instruments allows investors to
thoughtfully invest in young startups without valuing them at the time of the seed
investment. They allow future funding rounds to determine value when the startup is more
mature and has an operating history that lends itself to valuation analysis. Over the last
fifteen years, deferred-equity instruments have become important financing tools for
young startups.
Deferred-equity instruments were designed for a particular setting. They were
designed for Specialized Startup Investors to use when investing in young startups with a
reasonable chance of doing a future, traditional venture capital round. However, like many
innovations, deferred-equity instruments’ usage expanded beyond its original purpose.
Once Regulation Crowdfunding (Regulation CF) came into effect on May 16, 2016,12
issuers started using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from public investors
through funding portals. Is that good or bad? Does valuation deferral, which is beneficial
for Specialized Startup Investors, also benefit public investors in Regulation CF offerings?
Or, do these instruments create problems that make them generally unsuitable for
Regulation CF offerings? The suitability of deferred-equity instruments for Regulation CF
offerings drew the attention of a few scholars in 201613 and the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in 2017,14 but the issue has since largely faded
into the background. Meanwhile, deferred-equity instruments have become a prominent
financing choice for Regulation CF issuers.
Despite its indispensable role in startup investing, valuation receives little attention
from legal academics and policymakers. This article explicitly considers valuation in its
analysis of deferred-equity instruments. Financial investors make investments to generate
future cash flows. The fundamental value of any financial investment is the present value
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9. Safe is an acronym for “simple agreement for future equity.” While each letter in an acronym is often
capitalized (e.g., AIDS or NASA), Y Combinator decided to write the word in lower case. Paul Graham,
Announcing the Safe, a Replacement for Convertible Notes, Y COMBINATOR (Dec. 6, 2013),
https://blog.ycombinator.com/announcing-the-safe-a-replacement-for-convertible-notes/ [hereinafter Graham
(2013)] (“‘Safe’ comes from ‘Simple agreement for future equity.’ Although the name is an acronym, we got
tired of typing ‘SAFE’ all the time when talking about it, and we’ve already switched to lowercase.”). Since the
first safe was invented by Carolyn Levy, a Y Combinator partner, this article adopts Y Combinator’s lowercase
“safe” spelling.
10. Id. (“YC partner (and lawyer) Carolyn Levy has created a new alternative to convertible notes, called a
safe, that has the advantages of convertible debt without some of the disadvantages.”).
11. Gregory Raiten, 500 Startups Announces ‘KISS’, 500 STARTUPS BLOG (July 3, 2014), https://500.co/kiss/
(“We’re thrilled to announce a totally unsexy, yet super useful, set of legal documents for founders and investors
affectionately called the KISS (‘Keep It Simple Security’).”).
12. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) was signed into law on April 5, 2012. Pub.
L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). Title III of the JOBS Act established the foundation for a retail securities
crowdfunding exemption (the “Title III exemption”) that is codified in sections 4(a)(6) and 4A of the Securities
Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), 77d-1. To implement the Title III exemption, the SEC promulgated a set of
rules referred to as “Regulation Crowdfunding” or “Regulation CF.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100 et seq. The SEC
adopted the final rules on October 30, 2015, which mostly took effect on May 16, 2016. See Crowdfunding,
Securities Act Release No. 33-9974 (Oct. 30, 2015).
13. Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-SAFE SAFE, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
168 (2016) [hereinafter Green & Coyle (2016)].
14. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Be Cautious of SAFEs in Crowdfunding, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May
9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_safes [hereinafter SEC Investor Bulletin].
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15. JANET KIHOLM SMITH, RICHARD L. SMITH & RICHARD T. BLISS , ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE:
STRATEGY, VALUATION & DEAL STRUCTURE 342 (2011).
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
17. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29.
18. See generally SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 342.
19. Priced Round, FUNDERSCLUB: EDUC. CTR., https://fundersclub.com/learn/glossary/q/priced-round/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2020). The FundersClub glossary uses the term “priced round.” However, the terms “priced
equity” and “priced-equity round” are used interchangeably.
20. Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 42. (“Over the past decade, there has been an explosion in seed
financing for early-stage technology startups.”).
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of those projected future cash flows. 15 Equity investors have a residual claim to the
corporation’s assets (its excess cash after creditors have been paid, or what this article
refers to as the “residual”), which they generally collect through dividends and liquidation
distributions. The value of a share of stock, therefore, should reflect the present value of
the future dividends and liquidation distributions that share projects to generate for a
stockholder.16 Predicting those future payments fundamentally requires forecasting the
company’s future profits or cash flows and assessing the risk associated with this future
performance.17 While these tasks are always challenging, even for mature, publicly traded
companies, they are unavoidably difficult for young startups for two principle reasons.18
First, projecting future profits/cash flows for a new venture without any meaningful
operating history is very difficult and is often little better than guesswork. Second, the
projections are usually subject to extreme uncertainty.
Conventional stock deals are commonly referred to as “priced rounds” or “priced
equity.”19 When investors buy stock, they purchase an ownership percentage in the
company. To price that percentage, the company and the investors must agree on a
company valuation. If the parties cannot agree, the company cannot be priced, and no
investment takes place. With deferred-equity instruments, investors still purchase a
percentage of the company. However, the percentage amount is not determined until a
later date, typically when a future stock offering occurs. Pricing is thus deferred to the
subsequent offering. Deferred-equity instruments change the investment analysis from
forecasting a young startup’s future profits/cash flows and accounting for their uncertainty
(which is unavoidably difficult) to predicting whether it will conduct a future, high-quality
stock offering (which is a manageable task for Specialized Startup Investors).
Finding seed funding solutions for young startups is critical. Young startups need
capital to launch and grow. Without this capital, fewer startups are formed and more fail.
Deferred-equity instruments offer a partial solution by helping issuers and investors avoid
the typical young-startup valuation challenge. Over roughly the last ten years, US seed
financing has exploded for the traditional startup market20—which consists of Silicon
Valley-style startups that raise capital from Specialized Startup Investors—and deferredequity instruments have helped. This article examines how valuation deferral works and
explains why these instruments make a positive contribution to the traditional startup
market. They allow expert investors to make thoughtful investments in an inherently
uncertain environment.
However, the spread of deferred-equity instruments to the Regulation CF market is
a different matter. This article examined the Regulation CF offerings on three popular

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 60 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/14/2020 9:49 AM

VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT

473

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

21. Sherwood Neiss, Today’s Best Crowdfunding Platforms—By the Numbers, VENTUREBEAT (June 9,
2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/06/09/todays-best-crowdfunding-platforms-by-the-numbers/.
22. REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
23. STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
24. WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
25. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. “FINRA is authorized by Congress to protect America’s
investors by making sure the broker-dealer industry operates fairly and honestly. [FINRA oversees] more than
634,000 brokers across the country—and analyze[s] billions of daily market events.” About FINRA, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
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funding portals21—Republic22; StartEngine23; and Wefunder24—to get an informed
picture of Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings. The examination consisted of all the
Regulation CF deals funded through those three portals during 2019 (the “Study”). The
Study captured 205 funded deals, of which seventy-one were safe offerings and twentytwo were convertible note offerings. It examined the deferred-equity issuers and the terms
of their instruments. Based on that review, this author concludes that most of the deferredequity offerings in the Study are very risky investments that do not appear to offer
investors enough upside potential to offset the risk. More specifically, this author
concludes:
x Most of the issuers appear unlikely ever to raise money from venture capital
firms.
x The instruments’ terms are very issuer friendly. The instruments are far more
favorable to issuers than one would expect for such high-risk investments.
x The issuer-friendly terms raise concerns that Regulation CF investors lack the
sophistication to understand and internalize the risks and terms of their
investments.
While deferred-equity instruments have been a positive innovation for the traditional
startup market (facilitating informed capital raising for young startups), they are not
performing a similar role in the Regulation CF market. In the Regulation CF market, these
instruments allow issuers to transfer very high-risk investments to public investors while
generally limiting the investors’ upside potential. Although a few deals may turn out to be
successful, this arrangement is unlikely to produce a sustainable source of capital for
young startups, but it is likely to harm public investors. To address the problem, this article
recommends that the SEC or FINRA25 impose a suitability duty on funding portals that
host Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains a typical startup’s life and funding
cycle. Part II presents a valuation overview for startups. The overview highlights the
unavoidable valuation challenges that young startups and their investors face. Part III
examines Specialized Startup Investors’ use of deferred-equity instruments in the
traditional startup market and explains how they help these investors overcome the
valuation challenges so they can make thoughtful seed investments. Part IV examines the
use of deferred-equity instruments in Regulation CF offerings and explains their
shortcomings. Part IV also explains how a suitability duty should be imposed on funding
portals to protect public investors. Finally, Part V offers a conclusion.
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26. By some estimates, livelihood businesses account for more than ninety percent of US small businesses.
DANIEL SANDLER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND TAX INCENTIVES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2004).
27. For example, Janet Kiholm Smith, Richard L. Smith, and Richard T. Bliss divide new venture
development into six stages: (1) Opportunity; (2) Research and Development; (3) Start-up; (4) Early-growth; (5)
Rapid-growth; and (6) Exit. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 15–17. Luisa Alemany and Job J. Andreoli
divide new venture development into four stages: (1) Seed; (2) Startup; (3) Growth; and (4) Maturity. Luisa
Alemany & Job J. Andreoli, Introduction to Entrepreneurial Finance, in ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF GROWING VENTURES 2, 13–19 (Luisa Alemany & Job J. Andreoli eds., 2018).
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Defining “startups” upfront is useful. Startups are recently formed companies that
start small but are built to grow rapidly and have the potential to become the large,
dominant companies of the future. The high-technology companies congregating in
Silicon Valley epitomize the US startup. They differ from most small businesses—such as
local restaurants, owner-operated convenience stores, hair salons, and local construction
companies—that are built to provide an income for the founders (“livelihood
businesses”).26 Unlike startups, livelihood businesses are low-growth ventures with no
realistic hope of ever becoming large, dominant companies.
Like all businesses, startups must progress through a life cycle. While there is no
single formulation for the startup life cycle,27 this article divides it into four stages.
(1) Idea stage. The startup is just beginning and must determine whether the
business venture is worth pursuing. For example, the founders have an idea for
a new product, but have yet to develop a proven prototype.
(2) Development stage. The startup’s concept shows promise. For example, the
technology has been shown to work (e.g., a prototype has been built and tested),
supply chains and production lines have been developed, and the company is
prepared to commercially introduce its product. However, sales have not yet
begun.
(3) Sales-introduction stage. The startup has started production and has some
sales. For example, the technology is being sold and showing some commercial
viability. The rapid sales expansion that characterizes startups, however, has not
yet taken place.
(4) Rapid-growth stage. The startup is relatively mature and has shown success at
scaling up its business. This is the rapid-growth phase for the startup.
Because startups are built for growth, they generally must sacrifice near-term
profitability and endure years of losses. Losses are often moderate during the idea stage
but accelerate during the development stage as the startup undertakes the expense of
product development and building a functioning commercial enterprise. Sales begin in the
sales-introduction stage. As sales increase, losses should eventually start to slow. Sales
grow rapidly in the rapid-growth stage. If the startup is to become a successful, sustainable
company, this is when it becomes profitable. Figure 1 shows a startup’s life cycle along
with a possible revenue and loss/profit performance through the four stages.
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Figure 1
Startup Life Cycle28
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28. This diagram was motivated by a diagram produced by Aswath Damodaran in D ARK SIDE OF
VALUATION, supra note 1, at 260.
29. Because friends and family often invest for altruistic reasons, rather than purely profit-driven ones, they
can provide some of the fastest and most favorable capital. It also helps explain why friends and family investors
are often pejoratively referred to as “friends, family, and fools.”
30. Susan G. Cohen & Yael V. Hochberg, Accelerating Startups: The Seed Accelerator Phenomenon, 9–12
(Mar. 30, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418000; C. Scott Dempwolf, Jennifer
Auer, Michelle D’Ippolito, Innovation Accelerators: Defining Characteristics Among Startup Assistance
Programs, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC. 3–5 (Oct. 2014), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs425Innovation-Accelerators-Research-Summary-FINAL.pdf.
31. Cohen & Hochberg, supra note 30, at 11; Dempwolf, Auer & D’Ippolito, supra note 30, at 1.
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Startups need funding to advance through their life cycles. Few founders have
enough resources to self-finance their startups through profitability. Founders usually
provide the initial funding, then look to external funding sources. Some of the more
important external investors are: (1) friends and family; (2) accelerators; (3) angels; and
(4) venture capital firms.
(1) Friends and family are, as the description suggests, the founders’ friends and
family members who are willing to provide funding.29
(2) Accelerators are highly selective programs that help speed up the business
development process for young startups. Accelerators bring in cohorts of
startups for an intense, immersive experience. Most programs have a fixed term
(often three months) during which time the startups work with a group of
mentors to jumpstart their businesses.30 An accelerator makes money by
investing small amounts in its startups.31
(3) Angels are wealthy individuals who invest their own capital directly in startups.
Beginning in 1996 with Band of Angels, many angels do their investing through
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formal angel groups.32 The groups’ formalities vary considerably. Some are
formal with full-time management and standardized investment practices, while
some are quite informal.33
(4) Venture capital firms come in several forms, but most are professionally
managed funds. Outside investors—such as pension funds, insurance
companies, university endowments, and extremely wealthy individuals—
commit money to a fund that is managed by professionals who are charged with
“investment selection, working with entrepreneurs, and harvesting the
investments.”34
The different investor types tend to focus on different stages in a startup’s life cycle.
Friends and family are often the earliest external investors while venture capital firms are
often the latest. Table 1 shows the stages in which the different funding sources tend to
operate.
Table 1
Four Stages of a Typical Startup Funding Sequence
Life-Cycle Stage
Potential Investors
Idea Stage
x Founders
x Friends and family
x Accelerators
Development Stage
x Accelerators
x Angels
x Early-stage venture capital firms
Sales-introduction Stage x Angels
x Intermediate-stage venture capital firms
Rapid-growth Stage
x Late-stage venture capital firms
x Angels
Seed financing—which is often used to fund research, product development, and the
rollout of the company’s product or service—comes before the traditional venture capital
financing rounds that are commonly labeled Series A rounds, Series B rounds, and
onwards.35 The Series A, Series B, and onward rounds are when the startup sells
convertible preferred stock to investors. When venture capital firms (or angels) are willing
to conduct Series A rounds changes over time. Sometimes venture capital firms are willing
to invest earlier in the life cycle, sometimes later. However, what is generally constant is
a desire to see meaningful sales and business traction. As a result, the seed stage typically
begins during a startup’s idea or development stage and runs into its sales-introduction
stage.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 61 Side B

32. Sohl, supra note 3, at 29.
33. Id. at 29–35.
34. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 41.
35. The “Series A,” “Series B,” and onward labels come from the fact that venture capital firms typically
receive convertible preferred stock when they invest. Because each round of convertible preferred stock has its
own specific terms, each requires a unique label. The first round is commonly labeled Series A, the second round
Series B, and onward.

05/15/2020 10:30:18

C M
Y K

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 62 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/14/2020 9:49 AM

VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT
II.

477

VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS

Valuation is a prerequisite to thoughtful investing. Putting aside for a moment what
“value” means, reasonable investors seek investments offering the best value. If an
investor is considering whether to make an investment, it wants to determine the
investment’s value and compare it with the acquisition cost. If an investor is choosing
between different investments, it wants to choose the most valuable one. Investors cannot
make these determinations unless they can value their investment opportunities, which
leads to the fundamental proposition: Thoughtful investors should not invest in young
startups unless they can value the opportunity. This Part looks at the challenges analysts
face when valuing young startups. Understanding these challenges helps lawyers,
academics, lawmakers, and regulators better understand deferred-equity instruments. An
understanding of valuation is necessary to provide guidance on how to use the instruments,
when to use them, and when to avoid them.
A. Financial Instruments
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Y K
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36. For an accessible introduction to financial instruments, see FRANK J. FABOZZI, FRANCO MODIGLIANI &
FRANK J. J ONES, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2010).
37. Id. at 3.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 62 Side A

Financial investments involve buying and selling rights to future cash flows.
x Issuers sell rights to future cash flows in order to receive immediate cash.
x Investors pay immediate cash to buy the issuers’ rights to future cash flows.
For example, assume TechCo, a startup, issues $10 million of common stock to a
group of investors. TechCo receives $10 million of immediate cash to grow the company.
However, it gives up a portion of its future cash flow rights to the investors. The investors
part with $10 million of cash, but they receive a pro rata right to TechCo’s accumulated
future cash flows, or its residual. TechCo does the deal because it believes the immediate
cash is worth more than the future cash rights it is selling. The investors do the deal because
they believe their right to TechCo’s future residual is worth more than the immediate cash
they are giving up.
Financial instruments are investment contracts that allow investors to buy, and
issuers to sell, future cash flow rights. There are many types of financial instruments.36
One way to organize the concept is to classify financial instruments as loan-based (debt
instruments) or ownership-based (equity instruments).37
x Debt instruments. The issuer borrows money from investors in exchange for
a repayment promise. The issuer promises to repay the amount borrowed (the
principal) as well as pay interest to compensate investors for lending the
money. The investors’ future cash rights are the principal and interest
payments.
x Equity instruments. The issuer sells investors an ownership stake in the
company. Because so many startups are corporations, this article focuses on
corporate equity instruments, or stock. Stockholders receive rights to the
corporation’s residual, which they generally collect through dividends and
liquidation distributions.
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B. What Is Value?
A valuation analysis seeks to determine something’s value. Most people intuitively
appreciate what “value” means: it refers to the benefits that something produces.40 For a
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38. For example, California’s usury law limits interest rates on non-consumer loans to the higher of (a) ten
percent or (b) five percent over the rate charged for advances to member banks by the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco on the twenty-fifth day of the month prior to the loan’s origination. CAL. C ONST. art. XV, § 1.
39. Interest rates must not fall below Internal Revenue Service minimum interest rates, or they could trigger
“original issue discount” consequences. I.R.C. § 1272(a).
40. There are many “value” definitions. For example, acquisition value, book value, enterprise value, fair
value, fair market value, going-concern value, intrinsic value, investment value, liquidation value, and transaction
value are all common value definitions. Each definition measures value differently and is used in a different
context. Despite the varying definitions, the intrinsic or fundamental value for any asset or service (including a
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Not all instruments fit neatly into one category or the other. The features of
convertible notes, safes, and the KISS are discussed in detail below in Parts III and IV.
However, to help readers understand how these instruments fit on the loan-based versus
ownership-based spectrum and why they are classified as deferred-equity instruments,
here is a cursory summary.
x Convertible notes are short-term loans that convert to equity if the startup
completes a qualified future equity financing. They are debt instruments,
meaning the startup must repay the principal and pay interest. However, unlike
traditional debt, convertible note investors do not look to be repaid with cash.
Instead, they hope to be repaid with shares from the qualified future equity
financing.
x Safes are a contractual right to receive a startup’s stock if it completes a
qualified future equity financing. Unlike convertible notes, safes do not require
repayment. Investors purchase the safes and receive stock in the qualified
future equity financing if it occurs.
x The KISS comes in two versions. There is a debt version that is comparable to
a convertible note and an equity version that is comparable to a safe. Any
references in this section to convertible notes can be read to include the debt
version of the KISS. And any references to safes can be read to include the
equity version of the KISS.
Convertible notes fall into both the debt and equity categories. They are debt
instruments for state lending law38 and Internal Revenue Service tax purposes.39 They also
require principal repayment and earn interest. However, they derive most of their
economic value from the equity securities into which they convert. Safes, on the other
hand, do not fit neatly in either category. They do not require principal repayment or earn
interest, so they are clearly not debt. Moreover, they do not entitle holders to an immediate
ownership stake in the company. However, as with convertible notes, they grant investors
a future right to equity securities.
From an investor’s perspective, convertible notes and safes are best described as
deferred-equity instruments. Investors buy them to obtain future ownership rather than
immediate ownership. The cash flows investors buy are largely equity cash flows; namely,
a right to the startup’s residual. Those cash flows are simply deferred.
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financial investor, the benefit is the future cash flows that come from the financial
instrument. Thus, the value of a financial investment is the present value of its future cash
flows.
1. Stock and Its Future Cash Payments
Over the last twenty years, several new financial instruments have emerged for
funding startups,41 including tokens,42 venture debt,43 and revenue-based loans.44 While
these new instruments expand startup funding options in some settings, the primary
external capital sources for young startups are equity and deferred-equity instruments.45
Therefore, this article focuses its valuation discussion on stock and the future cash flows
it generates for investors.
Corporate stock comes in two basic flavors: common and preferred. Common stock
is the classic equity instrument. It provides stockholders with rights to the corporation’s
residual (see Figure 2). A corporation’s residual is its net assets after accounting for
liabilities owed. Assuming a typical form of common stock, stockholders generally receive
two economic rights from their stock, both of which relate to the corporation’s residual.
x Dividends. If the corporation has a positive residual, it may distribute a portion
of the residual to stockholders through dividends.46
x Liquidation distribution. If the corporation is liquidated, its stockholders
share equally in the corporation’s final residual after all its liabilities have been
satisfied.47
The value of a share of common stock, therefore, should reflect the present value of
the corporation’s future dividends plus its liquidation distribution.

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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financial investment) is the present value of the future benefits (such as cash flows or profits) that come from the
asset or service. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29. See also FABOZZI, MODIGLIANI & JONES,
supra note 36, at 3.
41. J. Brad Bernthal catalogued the new financial instruments in Bernthal, supra note 8, at 789–814.
42. Companies using blockchain technology may use tokens to raise capital. There are different types of
tokens. Some blockchains require tokens to operate, with these tokens referred to as intrinsic, or native, tokens.
Other tokens are not essential to the blockchain architecture, and instead represent a claim on an underlying asset.
These other tokens are referred to as asset-backed tokens. Some blockchains, such as the Bitcoin blockchain,
require intrinsic tokens to operate, while others do not. However, all blockchains can use asset-backed tokens.
Blockchain companies can raise capital by selling asset-backed tokens to purchasers.
43. See infra note 135.
44. See id.
45. Startup Equity Investments: Introduction to Equity Investing in Early-Stage Startups, FUNDERSCLUB :
EDUC.
CTR.,
https://fundersclub.com/learn/guides/understanding-startup-investments/startup-equityinvestments/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
46. See, e.g., DEL. C ODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170.
47. See, e.g., DEL. C ODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)–(b).
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Figure 2
A Corporation’s Residual

2. Profits, Free Cash Flows, and the Residual
Where does the residual come from? The residual is the company’s excess cash—
after creditors have been paid and reinvestment needs have been met—that shareholders
can receive. This excess cash comes from running a profitable business. Profits are a
company’s revenues minus its expenses. Companies report profits in several different
ways (e.g., gross profits, operating profits, pre-tax profits, and net income) based on which
expenses are being deducted.50 In each case, the profit measurement provides useful
information, but is an accounting number subject to various accounting rules. As a result,
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48. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 353.
49. See id.
50. “Gross profit” measures a firm’s revenues minus its production costs. “Operating profit” measures a
firm’s revenues minus its production costs and operating costs. “Pre-tax profits” measures a firm’s revenues
minus its production costs, operating costs, interest expenses, and amortization/depreciation charges. It also
includes any extraordinary income or expenses, but it does not deduct the firm’s income taxes. “Net income” is
the firm’s bottom-line profit. It accounts for all the firm’s revenues and expenses, including income taxes.
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What about investors who sell their shares before the corporation liquidates? While
they do not receive all the dividends or the liquidation distribution, they are not left emptyhanded.48 They receive a lump-sum payment when they sell their shares that should
approximate the value of the post-sale dividends and liquidation distribution.49 Thus, even
when an investor intends to resell her common stock before liquidation, the stock’s value
should reflect the present value of all the future dividends plus the liquidation distribution
associated with the shares.
If the corporation has multiple classes of stock (e.g., common and preferred stock),
the stockholders’ residual rights can be more complex. Priorities and mandatory payments
must be accounted for. However, the fundamental concept remains the same. The
stockholders have rights to the corporation’s residual, which they collect through
dividends and a final distribution.
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while profits are where the residual originates from, none of the profit measurements
explicitly track the excess cash available to stockholders.
Free cash flow is the more accurate source for the residual. Free cash flow is the
extra cash produced by a company’s operations that stockholders could receive via
dividends or the liquidation distribution. This article is not a valuation primer, so it will
not dwell on the distinctions between free cash flow and profits. Instead, readers should
know that free cash flow forecasts are derived from a company’s profit projections. There
are a few ways to calculate free cash flows, 51 but each approach begins with profit
projections that are then adjusted to arrive at free cash flows.52 Readers can think of free
cash flow forecasts as more refined profit forecasts. If profits cannot be estimated
confidently, neither can free cash flows.
C. Startup Valuation Methods

1. Discounted Cash Flow
A DCF analysis is arguably the most fundamental method for valuing financial
investments,55 including startup equity investments. A DCF analysis seeks to determine a
financial investment’s intrinsic value, as it directly measures the present value of the cash
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See, e.g., DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 347–48.
See generally id. at 349; see also DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 317–20.
See ASWATH D AMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE
VALUE OF ANY ASSET 11 (U. ed., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter INVESTMENT VALUATION] (“While discounted cash
flow valuation is only one of the three ways of approaching valuation and most valuations done in the real world
are relative valuations, it is the foundation on which all other valuation approaches are built. To do relative
valuation correctly, we need to understand the fundamentals of discounted cash flow valuation. To apply option
pricing models to value assets, we often have to begin with a discounted cash flow valuation. . . . Anyone who
understands [the fundamentals of a discounted cash flow analysis] will be able to analyze and use the other
approaches.”).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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There are many methods for valuing young startups, each with its own nuances. The
underlying concept, however, is constant: An investment’s value is equal to the present
value of the future cash flows it projects to generate. Some methods explicitly discount the
present value of the future cash flows, while others try to indirectly infer that value.53 This
article considers four of the more popular methods:54
(1) Discounted cash flow (DCF).
(2) Relative value.
(3) The venture capital method.
(4) The First Chicago method.
There is no single approach that is definitively the best method for all situations, and
there are plusses and minuses to each method. However, it is important to note that each
of the four methods described in this article—as well as most credible methods—require
forecasting the startup’s profits or cash flows. If reasonable profit/cash flow forecasts
cannot be generated, which is often the case for young startups, each of these methods
struggle to generate a useful valuation result.
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flows the investment expects to produce.56
a. The Basic Formula
The basic DCF formula is57:
ܸ݈ܽ ݁ݑൌ

ܨܥଶ
ܨܥଷ
ܨܥ
ܨܥଵ


 ǥ
ଶ
ଷ
ͳ   ݎሺͳ  ݎሻ
ሺͳ  ݎሻ
ሺͳ  ݎሻ

where
CF
CF1,2,3, etc.
n
r

= cash flow
= the subscript refers to the period when the future cash flows are
generated
= last period cash flows are to be received
= discount rate

There are many variations of the DCF model.58 However, the basic approach is
consistent between all of them: project the investment’s cash flows by period and apply a
discount rate to determine its present value.
Example: Mary has an opportunity to buy a financial instrument from TechCo for $75,000.
The instrument will pay Mary $10,000 for each of the next five years. At the end of five
years, TechCo will repurchase the financial instrument from Mary for $50,000. Assume that
five percent is a reasonable discount rate for Mary to apply. The financial instrument’s
present value is $82,471, making it a good buy.
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b. Information Inputs When Running a DCF for a Startup
Determining a startup’s equity value with a DCF calculation requires three sets of
information inputs. An analyst must (1) project the future cash flows that are expected to
come from owning the stock, (2) estimate a terminal value, and (3) estimate a discount
rate.
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56. DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 10; DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29.
57. See INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 12; DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 2–3.
58. Damodaran explains: “There are literally thousands of discounted cash flow models in existence.
Investment banks or consulting firms often claim that their valuation models are better or more sophisticated than
those used by their contemporaries. Ultimately, however, discounted cash flow models can vary only a couple of
dimensions.” I NVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 12.
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i. Free Cash Flows
For public companies that pay dividends, some analysts ignore the liquidation
distribution and focus on dividends as the sole source of investor cash flows. If the
company continues in perpetuity, “the only cash flow you receive when you buy shares in
a publicly traded firm is a dividend.”59 These analysts use the DCF analysis to value stock
as the present value of its projected future dividends, which is referred to as the dividend
discount model (DDM).60 The DDM approach is often used for determining whether
publicly traded stocks are overpriced or a bargain. If the present value of the projected
dividends is lower than the stock price, the stock is overpriced. And if the present value of
the projected dividends is higher than the stock price, the stock is a bargain. The DDM
approach can only be used for mature companies that already pay dividends,61 so it does
not work for most startups and definitely does not work for young startups. Young startups
lack the excess cash needed to pay dividends, and even when they become profitable, they
usually choose to retain their earnings to fund more growth.62
With the DDM approach eliminated, analysts commonly use the startup’s free cash
flows to approximate the stockholders’ future investment cash flows. 63 As noted above,
free cash flow is the extra cash produced by a company’s operations that stockholders
could receive via dividends or the liquidation distribution. The DCF measures the present
value of the startup’s projected free cash flows, or residual. The analyst must then
determine the portion of the residual represented by each share of stock.
ii. Terminal Value
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59. Id. at 323.
60. Id.
61. Luisa Alemany, Valuation of New Ventures, in ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: ART AND SCIENCE OF
GROWING VENTURES 214, 218 (Luisa Alemany & Job J. Andreoli eds., 2018).
62. See, e.g., Can Dividends Be Paid in Excess of Retained Earnings?, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 27, 2016),
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/can-dividends-be-paid-in-excess-of-retained-earnin.aspx (“Retained
earnings represent the accumulated earnings from a company since its formation. Most companies lose money
when they first start up, and so for a time, their retained earnings will be negative. That’s one reason why most
start-ups don’t pay dividends, in addition to the fact that new companies generally need to hold onto any cash
they have to grow their business.”).
63. See Alemany, supra note 61, at 217; see also SMITH, SMITH & B LISS, supra note 15, at 352–53.
64. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 304; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS , supra note 15, at 388 (Smith et
al. refer to terminal value as “continuing value”).
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Companies can potentially last forever, so valuing a startup with a DCF analysis
requires forecasting its free cash flows in perpetuity. However, projecting free cash flows
beyond a few years is often impractical. It becomes more of a guessing game than
thoughtful analysis. When a company produces free cash flows beyond the analyst’s
ability to generate thoughtful estimates (the “projection period”), a “terminal value”
calculation is used to capture the post-projection-period cash flows.64 The analyst projects
free cash flows for as many years as she feels confident in her projections, then concludes
the DCF calculation with a terminal value that approximates the value of the future free
cash flows from the end of the projection period until the end of time. The DCF formula
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with a terminal value is65:
ܸ݈ܽ ݁ݑൌ

ܨܥଶ
ܨܥଷ
ܨܥ
݁ݑ݈ܽݒ݈ܽ݊݅݉ݎ݁ݐ
ܨܥଵ


  ǥ

ሺͳ  ݎሻ
ሺͳ  ݎሻ
ͳ   ݎሺͳ  ݎሻଶ ሺͳ  ݎሻଷ

When a valued item is expected to generate cash flows in perpetuity, analysts often
calculate terminal value with the stable growth method.66 The stable growth method
assumes the valued item will settle into a constant growth rate.67 It takes the projected
cash flows from the final projection period and assumes they will grow at a constant rate
in perpetuity. The formula for the stable growth method is68:
ܶ݁ ݁ݑ݈ܽݒ݈ܽ݊݅݉ݎൌ 
where
CFf
g
r

ܨܥ ݔሺͳ  ݃ሻ
ݎെ݃

= free cash flow from the final period of the projection period
= the constant growth rate in perpetuity
= discount rate
iii. Discount Rate

Why do the projected cash flows need to be present valued? The reason: the promise
of receiving money in the future is worth less than an immediate payment of an identical
sum. Discounting the future cash receipts is meant to approximate the rate of return an
investor requires to buy the future cash flows. The discount rate has two components: (1)
the return rate for investing in a risk-free asset; and (2) a risk premium.69
(a) Risk-Free Rate
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INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 304.
See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 266–67.
INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 306.
Id.; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 391.
SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 354; SHANNON P. PRATT & ALINA V. N ICULITA, VALUING A
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 183 (5th ed. 2008); see also WILLIAM
J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH
ANALYSIS 151–54 (2012).
70. See PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 69, at 183.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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The time value of money recognizes the value of having money in hand. Money-inhand can be invested in profitable projects (e.g., it can be deposited in the bank and earn
interest), while future payments cannot. When a party defers receipt, she sacrifices these
investment opportunities. Additionally, inflation eats away at the value of future payments.
Assuming a three percent inflation rate, receiving $1,000 in one year is worth only $971
today (or $1,000/1.03). Assuming a constant three percent inflation rate for ten years,
$1,000 received at the end of the ten-year period is worth only $744 today (or
$1,000/1.0310). Collectively, the lost-investment-opportunities rate plus the inflation rate
represent a party’s “risk-free rate.”70 This is the return rate a party foregoes when it defers
payments, but without considering any risk associated with those payments.
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(b) Risk Premium
Parties could choose to commit all their funds to largely risk-free investments like
United States Treasury bonds. To induce parties to pursue riskier projects, there must be a
return above the risk-free rate that justifies the greater risk.71 This additional return is the
risk premium. It addresses the risk, or uncertainty, surrounding the valued asset’s future
performance. Projected payments are simply that; they are just projections. The risk
premium tries to account for the risk that the amount and timing of the forecasted payments
are wrong. The forecasted payments may be less than forecasted or take longer to generate
than expected. The greater the risk, the higher the discount rate; and the higher the discount
rate, the lower the present value of the projected free cash flows.
c. Simplified DCF Example
The following simplified example demonstrates how a DCF can work to determine
a company’s equity value.72
Example: An investor is considering investing $2 million in TechCo for a one-third
ownership interest in the company. Assuming the $2 million cash infusion, the investor
developed free cash flow projections for TechCo. The investor projected TechCo’s free cash
flows for the next seven years, at which point it believes TechCo will reach a stable growth
rate of three percent.
Future Year
1
Free cash
flows

2

$500,000 $2,000,000

3

4

5

6

7

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$4,500,000

$4,800,000

$5,000,000

Finally, the investor calculated its risk-free rate + risk premium for investing in TechCo as
thirty percent. With this information in hand, the investor estimated a terminal value for
TechCo of $19,074,074.
̈́ହǡǡ௫ሺଵାǤଷሻ
ǤଷିǤଷ

= $19,074,074

Here is the DCF for TechCo’s free cash flow projections + terminal value using a thirty
percent discount rate. The present value of TechCo’s projected free cash flows + terminal
value is $10,377,080.
7
$5,000,000
$19,074,074
$384,615 $1,183,432 $1,365,498 $1,400,511 $1,211,981

$994,446

$3,836,597

Total present value at 30% discount rate $10,377,080

71. Id. at 184.
72. The example is greatly simplified. Its only purpose is to show readers the basic steps and math behind a
DCF calculation.

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

Free cash
flows
Terminal
value
Present value
at 30%
discount rate

Future Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
$500,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000 $4,000,000 $4,500,000 $4,800,000
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The present value of the projected free cash flows + terminal value justifies the investment,
since 33.3 percent of $10,377,080 is greater than $2 million.

d. DCF Challenges for Young-Startup Valuations
When measuring a young startup’s equity value with a DCF analysis, the
information inputs are free cash flow projections, a discount rate, and a terminal value. If
an analyst has perfect information inputs, the DCF analysis is a trivial exercise. The analyst
can take her perfect information inputs, plug them into the DCF formula, and generate an
accurate result that would lead to a perfect answer. However, these information inputs are
subject to substantial uncertainty. Multiple futures with varying associated probabilities
await any company. With young startups, the distribution of potential outcomes is usually
very broad. In fact, the distribution of outcomes can be so broad for young startups that it
jeopardizes the usefulness of the DCF value result.
i. Projecting Free Cash Flows

(a) No Meaningful Operating History

73. MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS , supra note 69, at 136.
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Building a profit model requires forecasting the company’s revenues and costs. A
common method is to forecast revenues, then estimate the costs for that level of revenue
production to arrive at the profit estimates.73 Free cash flow estimates can be generated
from the profit forecasts. Generating revenue and cost projections for young startups is
particularly difficult due to extreme uncertainty about their future performance. Because
young startups often introduce new technologies, pursue new markets, and are led by
unproven managers, their futures are particularly uncertain. Will the new technology
function effectively? Will customers embrace the technology? Will the technology be
commercially scalable? Are the intellectual property rights strong enough to prevent
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Projecting a startup’s free cash flows is inherently difficult. It typically includes
analyzing, among other things:
x The current and future target market for the company’s products or services;
x The company’s business plan for pursuing the market opportunities;
x The company’s management team and its ability to successfully run the
company;
x The quality of the company’s products or services, including the company’s
ability to improve their quality over time;
x The strength of the company’s intellectual property rights;
x The company’s investment plan and access to financing;
x The competitive landscape for the company’s market opportunities; and
x The company’s historical track record.
With this type of information, one can begin to build a profit model for the startup’s
future performance, which can then be adjusted to project free cash flows. For young
startups—which lack meaningful operating histories and suffer from high failure rates—
generating such projections is often little better than guesswork.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 67 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/14/2020 9:49 AM

VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT

487

competitors, particularly larger ones, from taking away the opportunity? How sound is the
startup’s strategy for pursuing the opportunity? Will the startup have enough financial
resources to pursue the opportunity? How will the startup’s management team perform?
Forecasts are easiest to generate when there is a performance track record. It is easier
to project future iPhone sales and costs than it is to project a startup’s brand-new disruptive
technology. One of the most commonly used techniques for developing projections is to
extrapolate future performance from a historical track record,74 and this technique is
simply not available for young startups. Young-startup forecasts must be generated from
scratch. While not impossible,75 it requires more investigation and, as noted above,
involves much greater uncertainty. Practically speaking, when a startup lacks a meaningful
operating history, analysts often become more reliant on the startup’s estimates and their
accompanying biases,76 including the startup’s incentive to exaggerate its future results.
(b) High Failure Rate

ii. Choosing a Discount Rate
The discount rate’s risk-free component is usually easy to estimate. Analysts use the
rate available on “instruments that are considered to have virtually no possibility of default,
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74. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 208–11.
75. Id. at 212–22, for example, details several techniques; see also DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1,
at 276–90.
76. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 265.
77. Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF . OF ADVOC . (Sept.
2019), https://advocacy.sba.gov/2019/09/24/frequently-asked-questions-about-small-business/.
78. Carmen Noble, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founders Can Bounce Back, HARVARD BUS . SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 7, 2011), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-companies-failand-how-theirfounders-can-bounce-back (citing statistics from research by Shikhar Ghosh, a senior lecturer at Harvard
Business School).
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Underlying any attempt to forecast a young startup’s profits/cash flows is the fact
that most startups disappoint or fail. According to the Small Business Administration, only
about half of small businesses survive the first five years of operation.77 The more specific
statistics for startups are just as bleak. Citing research statistics from Harvard Business
School senior lecturer Shikhar Ghosh, a 2011 article in Harvard Business School Working
Knowledge offered the following sobering estimates.
x Thirty to forty percent of startups will end up liquidating their assets with
investors losing all (or most) of their investment.
x Seventy to eighty percent of startups will fail to generate investors’ projected
return on investment.
x Ninety to ninety-five percent of startups will fail to generate the profit
projections provided at the time of the investment.78
Because every young startup seeking capital claims it will be successful, investors
are left with the difficult task of picking the winners from the losers. Investors must
determine which young startups will achieve their profit projections and reach stable
growth, knowing full well that most will not. Making this determination is more
challenging when companies lack actual performance results to evaluate.
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such as United States Treasury obligations.”79 When valuing cash flows that extend far
into the future, such as when valuing a company, most analysts use the rate from a longterm Treasury bond (e.g., the ten-year or twenty-year United States Treasury bond).80
The challenging part of estimating a discount rate for a young startup is the risk
premium. With a traditional DCF analysis, the risk premium tries to capture all the young
startup’s uncertainty. A single number seeks to account for all the ways the forecasted free
cash flows could turn out different than the analyst’s singular projected future. This is a
blunt technique for addressing the distribution of potential outcomes. Standard approaches
for estimating the risk premium (or at least a portion of the risk premium) are not well
suited for young startups.81 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), for example,
measures a stock’s risk by examining its price fluctuations in comparison to the overall
market.82 Since young startups’ stocks are not publicly traded, there are no price
fluctuations to compare to the overall market. Proxies can be used for the price of the
young startup’s stock, but those proxies are often complicated83 and present their own
challenges. Moreover, CAPM does not capture the startup’s failure risk,84 which must be
separately estimated.
Recognizing the challenges in developing the risk premium, some analysts try to
account for risk directly in their free cash flow forecasts. For example, rather than forecast
a single, possible set of free cash flows, an analyst may forecast multiple free cash flow
scenarios and assign probabilities to each scenario.85 The benefit of the multiple-scenario
approach is it reduces the risk premium, making the discount rate easier to calculate. The
downside, however, is the challenge of generating multiple scenarios and coming up with
thoughtful probabilities.
iii. Terminal Value Problems
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79. PRATT & N ICULITA, supra note 69, at 183; see also DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 35–
36.
80. PRATT & N ICULITA, supra note 69, at 184 (referencing the twenty-year Treasury bond); D AMODARAN
ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 35–36 (referencing the ten-year Treasury bond).
81. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 265.
82. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 183.
83. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 290–96.
84. See id. at 266.
85. See SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 361–63; see also DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1,
at 75–104.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 67 Side B

Using a terminal value to complete a young startup’s DCF analysis presents serious
problems. As noted above, the stable growth method is commonly used to calculate
terminal value when valuing a company. However, it is not well suited for young startups.
A young startup may not become a stable growth firm for a long time (e.g., ten years,
twenty years, or more). This means the analyst may need to project free cash flows far into
the future—beyond her ability to generate thoughtful estimates. The late-year free cash
flow projections may be pure conjecture, rather than thoughtful analysis, and the same
holds true for the discount rate. Compounding matters, terminal value often accounts for
a large portion of a young startup’s overall value. Professor Damodaran notes that it is
“not unusual for the terminal value to account for 90%, 100%, or even more than 100% of
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the current value of a young [startup].”86 This means the valuation analysis is driven by a
calculation that comes from numbers that may be little more than guesswork.
iv. Summary of the DCF Challenges
Valuing young startups with DCF models is unavoidably difficult for investors.
They must project very uncertain free cash flows, usually before the startup has made its
first sale. They must come up with an appropriate discount rate that accounts for this
extreme uncertainty. And finally, they must estimate a terminal value that is itself
dependent on free cash flow projections and the discount rate, and that will likely account
for a substantial portion of the startup’s overall value.
2. Relative Value
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86. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 266.
87. See, e.g., SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 349.
88. MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS , supra note 69, at 189.
89. See id. at 191.
90. Apple
Inc.
(AAPL):
Summary,
YAHOO!
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/AAPL?p=AAPL&.tsrc=fin-srch (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
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Relative valuation (also referred to as “comparable valuation”)87 takes a different
approach than a DCF analysis. Rather than directly estimate an asset’s intrinsic value, the
relative valuation method measures value by looking at how others have priced the same
or similar assets. It uses the wisdom and experience of self-interested buyers and sellers to
estimate value.88 If the comparable transactions took place in a competitive market, it is
reasonable to assume that past buyers and sellers, in the aggregate, agreed to an appropriate
price. Typical characteristics for a competitive market are: (a) numerous buyers and
sellers; (b) each of the buyers and sellers is well informed about the merits of the
transaction; (c) the traded items are homogeneous (or fungible); (d) the buyers and sellers
are independent, profit-maximizers; and (e) the transaction costs for making an exchange
are low.89
Apple’s common stock, which trades on NASDAQ, provides a good competitive
market example.
x Numerous buyers and sellers: The average trading volume for Apple’s
common stock is over twenty-five million shares.90
x Well-informed buyers and sellers: The buyers and sellers benefit from an
extensive mandatory disclosure system for publicly traded stocks, as well as an
array of market intermediaries (such as research analysts, credit rating
agencies, and the financial press) that also inform transactions. Additionally,
information about stock quotes and transaction prices is freely available.
x Homogenous items: Each share of Apple common stock is identical.
x Buyers and sellers are independent, profit-maximizers: Most investors are
independent, profit-maximizers. They act in their own best interests to generate
investment returns.
x Low transaction costs: The cost to make a trade is very low—usually just a
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small sales commission.91
Because Apple’s common stock involves identical items trading on a highly
competitive market, its announced stock price provides a reasonable estimate of its value.
Similar analyses can be done for barrels of crude oil, bushels of soybeans, or any other
identical items trading on competitive markets.
a. Standardizing Values with a Ratio Analysis
What if an analyst wants to use past sales of a comparable item to value something
that is not identical? Assume a homebuyer wants to compare home prices in a
neighborhood. Some homes are bigger than others and sell for higher prices, and most of
the recent sales were for big homes. Can the homebuyer use the big-home sales to price a
small-home sale? Yes. She could use a ratio analysis.92 A ratio analysis allows for applesto-apples comparisons between comparable, but different assets. It evaluates relationships
between the sales price of similar assets and one or more relevant variables. 93 The similar
assets’ sales price is divided by the variable.
ܸ݈ܽ ݅ݐܽݎ݊݅ݐܽݑൌ 

݈ܵܽ݁ݐ݁ݏݏܽݎ݈ܽ݅݉݅ݏ݂݁ܿ݅ݎݏ
ܸܽ݁ܿ݅ݎ݄ݐ݅ݓݏ݁ݐ݈ܽ݁ݎݎܿݐ݄ܽݐ݈ܾ݁ܽ݅ݎ

ܸܧଶ
ܸܧଵ
ൌ
ܲଵ
ܲଶ
Where
EV1
P1
EV2
P2

= Economic variable for item 1
= Observed price for item 1
= Economic variable for item 2
= Expected price for item 2
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91. The Apple example largely came from MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 69, at 191.
92. Id. at 205.
93. Id.
94. $200 per square foot x 2,000 square feet = $400,000; and $250 per square foot x 2,000 square feet =
$500,000.
95. $200 per square foot x 3,000 square feet = $600,000; and $250 per square foot x 3,000 square feet =
$750,000.
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Ratios allow analysts to standardize values by correlating asset prices to the common
variable. The price-per-square-foot ratio used in the real estate industry offers one of the
clearest examples. If homes in a neighborhood are selling for $200 to $250 per square foot,
a buyer looking for a 2,000 square foot home knows to be prepared for prices in the
$400,000 to $500,000 range,94 while a buyer looking for a 3,000 square foot home knows
to be prepared for prices in the $600,000 to $750,000 range.95
Any variable that correlates with price can be used in a ratio analysis. In the above
real estate example, square-footage is the variable. The underlying assumption is that the
ratio between the variable and price can then be applied to a comparable situation where
only the variable is known. This relationship can be expressed with the following equation:
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b. Valuing Public Companies with Ratios
Ratios, also referred to as multiples, are commonly used to value public companies
and their financial instruments. In fact, ratios are probably the dominant public company
valuation method.96 One reason ratio analysis is so popular for public companies is that
the ratios are easy to calculate, and the relevant data is plentiful (see Figure 3). There are
publicly reported prices for stock sales as well as for sales of entire companies. And many
possible variables—such as earnings, revenues, and book value—are also publicly
reported.
Figure 3
Ratios for valuing companies

ܵ ݅ݐܽݎ݊݅ݐܽݑ݈ܽݒ݇ܿݐൌ 

݄ܵܽ݁ܿ݅ݎ݁ݎ
ܸܽ݁ݎ݄ܽݏݎ݈ܾ݁݁ܽ݅ݎ

Example: Alpha’s stock trades on NASDAQ for $30.00 per share. Alpha projects it will
generate $2.00 of earnings-per-share next year. Alpha’s stock is trading at a price-to-earnings
ratio of fifteen-times next year’s earnings-per-share.

 ݅ݐܽݎ݊݅ݐܽݑ݈ܽݒݕ݊ܽ݉ܥൌ 

݁ܿ݅ݎݏ݈݁ܽݏݕ݊ܽ݉ܥ
ܸ݈ܾܽ݁ܽ݅ݎ

96. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 107.
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Example: Alpha recently acquired Beta in an M&A transaction for $100 million. At the time
of the transaction, Alpha projected that Beta would generate $5 million of net income next
year. Alpha purchased Beta at a price-to-earnings ratio of twenty-times next year’s net
income.
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Ratios can be used to generate valuation ratios for shares of stock or entire companies.
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Ratios can be generated using variables generated (a) in the past (“trailing ratios”),
(b) in the current year (“current ratios”), or (c) in the next few years (“forward ratios”).
Because stock/company valuations should be based on future performance (and the future
residual), current and forward ratios are usually the more appropriate valuation tool. 97
i. Earnings Ratios
Earnings ratios are widely used for valuing public stocks and companies.98 This
makes sense because the benefit stocks and companies generate for investors are future
cash flows that come from the issuer’s profits. Price-to-earnings (PE) ratios use the
company’s net income or net income-per-share, which is the bottom-line profit number.
Earnings other than net income are also used for ratio analyses. For example, EBITDA
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization) and EBIT (earnings before
interest and tax) ratios are commonly employed.
ii. Non-Earnings Ratios
While earnings ratios make the most intuitive sense, since they clearly correlate with
investor cash flows, any variable that correlates with price can be used. Price-to-revenue
and price-to-book value99 ratios are examples of non-earnings ratios.
iii. How a Ratio Analysis Works

Example: Alpha is considering buying another company, Beta. Before commencing serious
negotiations, Alpha conducted a PE ratio analysis to get a feel for Beta’s potential value
range.
x

Step 1—Identify comparables with known valuations and profit forecasts.
Alpha identified four similar companies that were sold within the last few years—
let us call them Companies A, B, C, and D. These companies involved similar
product profiles, market sizes, and results.
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97. Despite the greater valuation relevance of current and forward PE ratios, most financial websites and
newspaper stock tables report trailing PE ratios. This likely stems from the ease of finding and using historical
results. Current and forward PE ratios require projecting future results, which is a more challenging exercise.
98. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 110.
99. For purposes of book value ratios, “book value” represents the net value of the company’s assets as
reported on its balance sheet.
100. MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS , supra note 69, at 206.
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Using a ratio to value a company normally involves a three-step process.100
x Step 1—Identify comparable stocks or companies with identifiable prices and
profit forecasts.
x Step 2—Calculate earnings ratios for the comparable stocks or companies.
x Step 3—Adjust and apply the ratios to the company being valued.
The following example uses forward PE ratios from recent comparable-company
sales to value a target company in an M&A transaction.
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Company B
Company C
Company D
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Acquisition Price
$1,000 million
$1,680 million
$300 million
$540 million

In addition to knowing the companies’ acquisition prices, Alpha also knows their
projected next-year net income at the time of the sale.

Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
x

Projected Next-Year Net
Income at the Time of the Sale
$50 million
$70 million
$20 million
$30 million

Step 2—Calculate valuation ratios for the comparables. With this information,
Alpha generated valuation ratios for the comparable companies.
Comparable Company PE Ratios
Acquisition price
Next-year’s net
income
Acquisition price
as a multiple of
next-year’s net
income

B
$1,680
million

C
$300
million

D
$540
million

$50 million

$70 million

$20 million

$30 million

20x

24x

15x

18x

Step 3—Adjust and apply the comparable valuation ratios to the asset being
valued. The comparable companies sold for between fifteen-times and twenty-fourtimes next-year’s net income. Alpha examined the comparable companies more
carefully and believes that Beta is better than Company C, but not as good as
Company B. Alpha may therefore want to use a valuation ratio of eighteen-times to
twenty-times next-year’s net income. Alpha forecasts Beta’s net income for next
year will be $4 million. As a result, a possible valuation range for Beta could be $72
million to $80 million.

e. Challenges in Using Relative Valuations for Young Startups

101. See Alemany, supra note 61, at 219.
102. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 311–16, for a thoughtful discussion of the many
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Despite near ubiquitous use in the public markets, relative valuation is not well
suited for young startups. One entrepreneurial finance textbook goes so far as to say, “It is
almost impossible to use the comparable method to estimate the value of a startup.”101
While that statement may be a bit strong, it is undeniable that using relative valuations is
challenging for startups in general and extremely challenging for young startups.
Relative valuations present several problems for young-startup valuations,102 but
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two problems particularly standout. The first is a lack of appropriate comparable
companies. The comparables for young startups should be other private startups. However,
since such comparables are not publicly traded, pricing data and profit projections are hard
(or, often, impossible) to obtain. Without comparable prices and variables, ratio analyses
cannot be done. Some analysts may try to use publicly traded companies for their ratio
analyses. However, this is only appropriate for mature startups that are far enough along
in their development cycle that comparing them to public companies is reasonable—which
excludes young startups. Second, young startups lack the variables normally used in a ratio
analysis. They do not themselves have meaningful revenues and their earnings are almost
certainly negative.103
3. Venture Capital Method
Due to the challenges presented by DCF and relative valuation analyses, some
investors use an alternative approach—the venture capital method—for valuing
startups.104 The venture capital method measures the present value of the startup’s
estimated exit value. The formula for the venture capital method is105:
 ݁ݑ݈ܽݒݕ݊ܽ݉ܥൌ 
where
r
n

݁ݑ݈ܽݒݐ݅ݔ݁݀݁ݐܽ݉݅ݐݏܧ
ሺͳ  ݎሻ

= target rate of return (or discount rate)
= period when the exit takes place

a. How It Works
Valuing a startup with the venture capital method generally involves four steps106:
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problems.
103. Some analysts overcome the lack of current profits and revenues by forecasting “the firm’s operating
results later in the life cycle . . . and use these forward revenues and earnings as the basis for valuation. In effect,
we will estimate the value of the business in five years, using revenues or earnings from that point in time.”
DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 315. The future valuation would then need to be discounted back to
present value. Forecasting a young startup’s future results and using them for the ratio analysis can work, but it
suffers from the same forecasting and uncertainty problems discussed earlier for DCFs.
104. Id. at 270; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS , supra note 15, at 367; Alemany, supra note 61, at 223–24.
105. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 270.
106. See id. at 270–71; see also SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 367–68.
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Investors buy startup stock to make money, and the most common way to make that
money is to sell the stock and collect capital gains. The venture capital method seeks to
calculate the present value of the investors’ cash receipt when they exit their investment.
There are two common exit strategies for startup investments.
(1) IPO exits. The startup conducts an IPO and creates a public secondary market
for its stock on a liquid stock exchange. Pre-IPO investors can sell their startup
stock on the newly established secondary market.
(2) Acquisition exits. The startup sells itself to another company. The acquirer
purchases all, or substantially all, of the startup in exchange for cash or publicly
traded stock.
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x
x
x
x

Step 1—Estimate how much funding the startup needs to reach an exit event.
Step 2—Estimate when the exit will occur.
Step 3—Estimate the startup’s exit value, frequently using a PE ratio.
Step 4—Discount the exit value back to present value using a target rate of
return.
The following example provides a simplified look at valuing a startup with the
venture capital method.
Example: A venture capital firm (VC) is considering whether to invest in TechCo. Following
a detailed analysis of the market for TechCo’s product and TechCo’s ability to pursue the
opportunity, VC made the following determinations:
x Step 1—Estimate how much funding TechCo needs to reach an exit event. VC
estimates that TechCo needs $10 million of funding to reach an exit event. VC believes
the exit event will be an acquisition exit.
x Step 2—Estimate when the exit will occur. VC believes that TechCo will be ready for
the acquisition exit in three years.
x Step 3—Estimate TechCo’s exit value. Three comparable companies experienced
acquisition exits within the last year. Those companies sold at PE multiples ranging
from twenty-times to twenty-four-times forward one-year net income. VC projects that
TechCo’s forward one-year net income will be $9 million at the time of exit. Therefore,
TechCo’s future exit value projects to range from $180 million to $216 million.
x Step 4—Discount the exit value back to present value. Since the exit is not expected
to occur for three years, the exit value must be discounted back to present value. Venture
capital firms commonly develop rate-of-return tables based on the startup’s stage of
development.107 VC judged TechCo to be a later stage company and determined thirtyfive percent to be the appropriate discount rate.

ܸܧ
̈́ͳͺͲ݈݈݉݅݅ͳʹ̈́ݐ݈݈݊݉݅݅݊
ൌ

ሺͳ  ݎሻ
ͳǤ͵ͷଷ
ൌ ̈́͵Ǥʹ݈݈݉݅݅̈́ݐ݊ͺǤͺ݈݈݉݅݅݊

ܲ ݁ݑ݈ܽݒݐ݊݁ݏ݁ݎൌ 

= exit value
= discount rate
= the period when the exit value occurs

If VC decides to make the $10 million investment, it will want to receive an ownership stake
in TechCo in the range of at least eleven percent ($10 million/$87.8 million) to fourteen
percent ($10 million/$73.2 million).

The above example assumes that VC’s $10 million investment is enough to fund the
startup through its exit. If additional funding is necessary to achieve the exit event, the
calculations get more complicated because they must account for the ownership dilution
that VC would experience.

The venture capital method provides an advantage over a DCF analysis by reducing
107. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 270.
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b. Venture Capital Method Challenges for Valuing Young Startups
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the profit projection period. With a DCF analysis, the analyst must project the company’s
free cash flows in perpetuity. When using the venture capital method, the analyst need
only project profits (assuming an earnings ratio) for the anticipated exit year (which is
often three to seven years in the future). While the projection period is shorter, the analyst
must still build a profit model. For young startups, that means the analyst still has the
challenge of building a profit model when future profits are likely to be highly uncertain.
Developing profit projections for companies without reliable sales, which defines young
startups, is an inherently difficult task even when the projection period is shortened.
The venture capital method also presents an optimism bias challenge.108 The model
projects a single, positive future event—the startup achieving an exit event—even though
that event may not occur. Recall that most young startups fail and never achieve a
successful exit. The discount rate (or target rate of return) is the primary tool for
counteracting the optimism bias.109 The more confidence the analyst has in the startup
reaching its exit event, the lower the discount rate. The less confidence the analyst has, the
higher the discount rate. However, despite the discount rate’s critical importance to the
valuation analysis, there is often little more than “intuition and experience” to guide the
analyst’s discount-rate decision.110 Stated more frankly, the chosen discount rate may be
little more than guesswork.
4. First Chicago Method
a. Variation of the Venture Capital Method

SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369.
See id.
SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 369.
Id.
Id.
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113.
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115.
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The First Chicago method is a variation of the venture capital method that seeks to
reduce the optimism bias. Rather than forecast one possible outcome, the venture capital
method forecasts multiple scenarios. A common iteration forecasts three scenarios:
success, failure, and sideways.111
x The success scenario is usually the same as the venture capital method’s exit
event.112
x The failure scenario usually assumes a worst-case scenario. Not only does the
startup fail to achieve an exit event, investors receive no return and lose their
invested capital.113
x The sideways scenario usually assumes a moderate performance level. There
is no successful exit event, but the startup does not completely fail.114 For
example, investors might recoup some or all their invested capital and possibly
even receive a modest additional return.115
The First Chicago method accounts for each scenario by assigning it a probability
weight. The investor must conduct a valuation for each scenario and assign a probability
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to its occurrence. The venture capital method can be used to determine the success
scenario. If the investor anticipates the failure scenario involves a total loss of investment,
then it can be valued at $0. Finally, the sideways scenario can be valued several different
ways, including with a DCF analysis, a relative valuation, or the venture capital method,
but assuming less-optimistic model inputs. The following example shows how the
probability weighting works.
Example: VC is once again considering whether to invest in TechCo. VC estimates that
TechCo will need $10 million of funding to reach an exit event, which will take place in
three years. Following a detailed analysis of the market for TechCo’s product and TechCo’s
ability to pursue the opportunity, VC valued three scenarios (each three years in the future)
and assigned them probabilities.

Expected Value
$180 million to
$216 million
$0

Success
scenario
Failure
scenario
Sideways
scenario

Probability
30%

Weighted Value
$54 million to $64.8 million

20%

$0

$10 million to $20
50%
million
Total weighted value

$5 million to $10 million
$59 million to $74.8 million

ܹܸ
̈́ͷͻ݈݈݉݅݅̈́ݐ݊ͶǤͺ݈݈݉݅݅݊
ൌ

ሺͳ  ݎሻ
ͳǤͳଷ
ൌ ̈́͵Ǥͺ݈݈݉݅݅̈́ݐ݊ͶǤ݈݈݉݅݅݊

ܲ ݁ݑ݈ܽݒݐ݊݁ݏ݁ݎൌ 

= weighted value
= discount rate
= the period when the scenarios are valued

If VC decides to make the $10 million investment, it will want to receive an ownership stake
in TechCo in the range of at least twenty-one percent ($10 million/$46.7 million) to twentyseven percent ($10 million/$36.8 million).

116. See MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 69, at 67–87.
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As noted earlier, a major drawback of the venture capital method is its focus on a
single, uncertain event. The analyst must then use a discount rate that is often quite high
to account for the uncertainty. The discount rate then aggregates useful information about
the potential future outcomes and hides it in a single number, which can fall prey to various
biases and problems.116 The First Chicago method forces the analyst to break the valuation
problem into its individual parts and expressly analyze each factor. This method accounts
for more uncertainty than if the analyst forecasts only a single possible outcome. As a
result, analysts should use a lower discount rate when employing the First Chicago
method, compared to the venture capital method, since the risk component should be
smaller.
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b. First Chicago Method Challenges for Valuing Young Startups
The First Chicago method requires building a similar profit model to the venture
capital method. The venture capital method forecasting challenges apply equally to the
First Chicago method. The First Chicago method does allow analysts to account for more
uncertainty, which can make the model-building exercise easier. However, if the most
important data remains largely guesswork, the analysis still struggles to generate a useful
result.
D. Valuation Challenges Discourage Investment
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117. Id. at 8.
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Left unaddressed, the young-startup valuation challenge discourages investment. If
rational investors cannot confidently value a company, they are less likely to invest.
Because few entrepreneurs have enough resources to self-finance their startups through
profitability, less investment capital leads to fewer startup formations, less young-startup
growth, and more young-startup failures.
No matter what method is used, the foundation of every valuation analysis is a threestep process:
(1) Collect information;
(2) Run the information through an economically valid model; and
(3) Interpret the results.117
A valuation model’s accuracy depends on the quality of its data. If the collected
information is guesswork, then so too is the valuation result. In the case of young startups,
their lack of operating history means they lack the data necessary to run robust valuation
analyses. When coupled with their extreme uncertainty, valuing young startups will always
be unavoidably difficult.
x A DCF analysis requires building the young startup’s profit model in
perpetuity (or until the stable growth period is reached, which may be ten,
twenty, or more years into the future). Without a track record to start from, the
forecasts may be little more than guesswork. A DCF analysis also requires
estimating the risk premium, but without the data that normally guides such
analysis for public companies.
x A relative valuation requires comparing the young startup’s performance to
comparable companies or comparable transactions. The young startup’s lack
of operating performance means there are few, if any, meaningful comparables.
Moreover, the young startup lacks the performance data needed to run the ratio
analysis.
x A venture capital method analysis requires building a young startup’s profit
model at the time of its exit for determining its exit value. This requires a
shorter profit model than for a DCF analysis, but still requires building a profit
model and coming up with a discount rate.
x A First Chicago method analysis requires building a similar profit model as
for the venture capital method but allows the analyst to account for more
potential outcomes. It suffers from the same forecasting problems as the
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III. OVERCOMING THE YOUNG-STARTUP VALUATION CHALLENGE WITH DEFERREDEQUITY INSTRUMENTS
Priced equity transactions dominated the startup funding model until the mid-2000s.
Entrepreneurs, friends and family, angels, and venture capital firms have traditionally
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118. SANDLER, supra note 26, at 8.
119. Id.; MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL I NVESTING: MATCHING START-UP FUNDS
WITH START-UP COMPANIES—T HE GUIDE FOR E NTREPRENEURS, I NDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE
CAPITALISTS 49–52 (2000).
120. Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends and Developments, 6 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 7, 13 (2003).
121. Jeffrey A. Timmons & Harry J. Sapienza, Venture Capital: The Decade Ahead, in THE STATE OF THE
ART OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 402, 421 (Donald L. Sexton & John D. Kasarda eds., 1992).
122. Sohl, supra note 3, at 23.
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venture capital method.
The young-startup valuation challenge is not a mere nuisance. It is a much more
serious and fundamental challenge that does not lend itself to easy fixes. This article spent
time explaining fundamental valuation analysis for startups to demonstrate this problem.
Yes, models can be built for young startups that look impressive. However, if they are
built on fanciful data, they are not very useful for guiding investment decisions. Using
highly-speculative valuation analyses to make investment decisions creates several
investing scenarios—none of which is optimal.
x Scenario 1—Throw caution to the wind. Investors can make their investment
decisions based on highly speculative analysis. Such an approach creates a high
likelihood of investors overpaying for their investments.
x Scenario 2—Only invest at bargain-basement prices. Investors can demand
bargain-basement prices when investing. Investors demand such low prices
that their portfolio companies do not need to perform all that well to justify the
investment. Entrepreneurs are likely to resist this approach, since they could
view it as giving away the company.
x Scenario 3—Avoid investing in young startups. Investors can simply choose
not to invest in young startups.
Until the mid-2000s, scenario 3 was frequently the choice for Specialized Startup
Investors. Through much of the 1980s, venture capital firms actively invested in young
startups.118 Beginning in the late 1980s, they largely abandoned early investing and shifted
to later stages.119 The shift was not a temporary trend, but instead reflected a systematic
change in the way venture capital firms operated.120 As venture capital firms exited the
seed investing market, angels filled the role. During the 1990s, angels and venture capital
firms operated in a complimentary relationship, where the angels provided “a kind of ‘farm
system of venture portfolios.’”121 Angels enabled startups to grow to a point where they
could attract venture capital interest. However, angel investors also began migrating from
earlier financing rounds to later rounds during the early 2000s.122 Why were Specialized
Startup Investors leaving the young-startup investment market? An inability to confidently
value the investment opportunities was likely a significant factor. If these investors could
accurately price deals, there would have been no reason for the mass migration.
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financed startups by buying stock. When investors purchase stock, they buy a percentage
of the startup, which first requires agreeing on a pre-money valuation for the company.123
If an investor wants to buy ten percent of a startup for $1 million, it must first determine
the startup is worth $9 million. Priced equity rounds are susceptible to the young-startup
valuation challenge because investments should not take place if the parties cannot agree
on the valuation. In the mid-2000s, Specialized Startup Investors began using deferredequity instruments to overcome this problem.
Even under the traditional funding model, many startup investors have learned to
tailor their investment contracts to address various startup investing challenges. Venture
capital firms and their use of convertible preferred stock offers the classic example.
Investing in startups—whether young or mature—is difficult. Startup investments are
plagued by uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problems 124 that limit
investors’ willingness to commit funds.125 All companies present investors with these
problems, but startups are an extreme case. Venture capital firms mitigate the problems by
employing a contract strategy that relies heavily on receiving convertible preferred
stock.126 This strategy allows venture capital firms to stage their investments,127 control
their portfolio companies,128 receive liquidation preferences and other downside economic
protections,129 and incentivize the startup managers to run their companies
successfully.130
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123. Readers should understand the difference between a “pre-money” and a “post-money” value. Both
measure a company’s value, but they do so at different times. Pre-money valuation is a company’s valuation
before an investment round, while post-money valuation is company’s valuation after the investment. Assume
an investor buys stock representing twenty-five percent ownership in a company for $5 million. The company’s
“post-money valuation” is $20 million (or $5 million/twenty-five percent). However, its pre-money valuation is
$15 million, which is calculated as the post-money valuation minus the investment.
124. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1407
(2008) [hereinafter Ibrahim (2008)] (“Start-up investments are rife with uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
potential agency costs in the form of potential opportunism by entrepreneurs.”).
125. PAUL A. GOMPERS & J OSH LERNER, MONEY OF INVENTION: H OW VENTURE CAPITAL CREATES NEW
WEALTH 23 (2001).
126. Ibrahim (2008), supra note 124, at 1407, 1411–16; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 125, at 41–59.
127. Venture capital firms usually stage their investments. Rather than fully fund the startup up front, they
provide partial funding over multiple rounds. Each financing round is meant to finance the startup to a milestone.
If the startup achieves the milestone, it receives more funding. If it fails to meet the milestone, the venture capital
firm can abandon the investment. Staging helps reduce the uncertainty and information asymmetry problems,
while also creating an incentive for management to do good work.
x
Reduces uncertainty. Staging allows venture capital firms to replace projections about the startup
with facts.
x
Reduces information asymmetries. Staging provides venture capital firms with improved access
to the startup’s most confidential information, particularly since the venture capital firm will likely
receive board representation.
x
Creates incentives. If the startup’s managers want more money for their company, they better work
hard and meet the targeted milestones.
128. Venture capital firms obtain substantial control over their portfolio companies. This control generally
stems from receiving board seats and special voting rights (e.g., class voting rights).
129. Preferred stock has a liquidation preference over common stock.
130. For example, the liquidation preference sets a tangible bar that management must reach before having
any right to the startup’s future profits. The startup’s managers typically own common stock, which provides
them a junior right to the residual. Because preferred stockholders collect their share of the residual first,
management must generate excess profits that exceed the liquidation preference before having any right to the
residual.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 74 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/14/2020 9:49 AM

VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT

501

Venture capital firms’ convertible preferred stock contract strategy has been
incredibly successful. It allows venture capital firms and other professional startup
investors (such as angel syndicates) to thoughtfully invest tens of billions of dollars each
year.131 The US startup market would not be what it is today without the convertiblepreferred-stock strategy. However, for all the problems it mitigates, convertible preferred
stock does not address the young-startup valuation challenge, as priced rounds require
valuing the startup.
Deferred-equity instruments do address the young-startup valuation challenge.
Convertible notes, safes and the KISS allow investors to thoughtfully invest in young
startups without valuing them at the time of investment. Future funding rounds determine
value when the startup is more mature and has an operating history. At that point, investors
can better estimate the startup’s future performance and risk premium.
Convertible notes, safes, and the KISS are all contractual instruments. This means
that issuers and investors can modify them, and potentially substantially. Part III provides
a general description of the different instruments as they are used in the traditional startup
market and explains why these “classic versions” are a positive contribution to the
traditional startup market. However, with the promulgation of Regulation CF in 2016,
crowdfunding issuers also began using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from
the general public. The “crowdfunding version” of deferred-equity interests often differs
from the classic version, and those differences are discussed in Part IV.
A. Convertible Notes
Traditional debt instruments, such as standard bank loans, are a primary funding tool
for livelihood businesses.132 Young startups, however, are not built for such traditional
debt 133 and are largely excluded from the small-business-lending market.134 Nevertheless,
there are a few debt instruments that startups can use to fund their growth.135 Convertible

05/15/2020 10:30:18

C M
Y K

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 74 Side A

131. NIZAR TARHUNI ET AL., 2Q 2019 PITCHBOOK-NVCA VENTURE MONITOR, PITCHBOOK 10 (July 10,
2019), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2q-2019-pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor. Late-stage venture capital
investments totaled $84.5 billion in 2018, $46.5 billion in 2017, $46.2 billion in 2016, $48.0 billion in 2015, and
$44.6 billion in 2014. Id.
132. 2018 FDIC SMALL B USINESS LENDING SURVEY, FED. DEPOSIT I NS. CORP . 1 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/sbls/full-survey.pdf (“The survival and growth of small businesses depends
on access to credit, and banks are the most common source of external credit for small firms.”).
133. They lack the excess cash flow needed for principal and interest payments and they also generally lack
meaningful securable assets.
134. See generally SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 52.
135. In additional to convertible notes, other startup debt instruments include venture debt and revenue-based
loans.
x
Venture debt. Select lenders, such as specialty banks and venture debt firms, Bernthal, supra note
8, at 798, provide traditional loans to startups that have obtained venture capital funding. Darian M.
Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. I LL. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2010). Ibrahim explains:
Venture debt does not mean debt from angel investors or VCs that is commonly converted
to equity; nor does venture debt mean loans to start-ups that have developed to the point of
attractiveness to traditional lenders. Instead, venture debt as defined here is loans to early
stage, rapid-growth start-ups that have no traditional means of paying it back.” Id. at 1171
(footnote omitted).
x
Revenue-based loans. Revenue-based loans (also referred to as “royalty financing”) are a form of
debt. In exchange for a loan, the startup promises to pay the lender a percentage of defined, future
revenues. In other words, the startup commits to paying a royalty until the loan is repaid. See Victoria
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notes are one such debt option, and the only meaningful debt option for young startups.136
Convertible notes started becoming a popular option for seed investors around 2005,137
and have since become a staple for seed financing.138 Young startups commonly use them
to raise modest sums (e.g., $500,000 to $1.25 million139), and it is often their first external
funding round.140 Convertible notes are used when a young startup is close to ready for a
meaningful venture-capital equity round.
1. Automatic Conversion if a Qualified Equity Financing Occurs
Convertible notes are short-term loans (e.g., one to three years) that convert to equity
in a few scenarios. The standard scenario calls for automatic conversion if the startup
conducts a qualified equity financing before the notes mature.141 A qualified equity
financing is often defined as a priced round of preferred stock that meets a certain size
threshold (such as $1 million of new cash raised).142 Convertible notes are debt
instruments, meaning the startup must repay the principal and pay interest. However,
unlike traditional debt, convertible note investors do not look to be repaid with cash—in
fact, the notes should prohibit prepayments.143 Instead, they hope to be repaid with shares
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Conversion in Next Financing. Upon the Company’s next sale of its preferred stock in a single
transaction or in a series of related transactions, in each case occurring on or before the Maturity Date,
for an aggregate gross purchase price paid to the Company of no less than [One Million Dollars
($1,000,000)] (excluding the principal amount of and accrued interest or any other amounts owing on
all Notes converted in such sale) (the “Next Financing”), the entire balance then outstanding under
each Note shall automatically be cancelled and converted into shares of the Company’s capital stock.
Kristine M. Di Bacco & Doug Sharp, Convertible Note Financing Term Sheet (Seed-Stage Start-Up),
LEXISNEXIS 4 (2018), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Convertible-Note-Financing-TermSheet-Seed-Stage-Startup.pdf [hereinafter Sample Convertible Note Term Sheet].
143. Id. at 3 (“[I]nvestors in convertible note financings generally will not permit prepayment, since a
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Silchenko, There’s a New-Old Sheriff in Town: Royalty Financing for Young Ventures, HUFFPOST
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/theres-a-newold-sheriff-i_b_9295908; Scott
Austin, An Alternative Financing Option for Start-ups—Entrepreneurs Going the Royalty Route Use
a Share of Revenue to Pay Back Loans, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704679204575646940403312602; Cliff Ennico,
Royalty Financing: The New Thing in Venture Capital, CREATORS (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.creators.com/read/succeeding-in-your-business/11/17/royalty-financing-the-newthing-in-venture-capital.
136. Young startups are generally not eligible for venture debt or revenue-based loans. They are not eligible
for venture debt because they are not yet mature enough to have pre-existing venture capital investors. And they
are not eligible for revenue-based loans because they are largely pre-revenue companies.
137. Convertible notes existed prior to 2005. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 161. However, the earlier
versions were for classic bridge financings and were not specifically tailored for young-startup financings. Id. It
was around 2005 that convertible notes were modified to resemble their current form and began to be used for
standalone financings. Id. at 161–62; see also Bernthal, supra note 8, at 804.
138. Peter Werner, Primer on Convertible Debt, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/convertible-debt/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Werner—Primer] (“Many early stage companies use convertible debt for
their initial fundraising.”); 4 Benefits of Raising Funding via Convertible Notes, LEAPFUNDER (Aug. 5, 2015),
https://www.leapfunder.com/blog/article/benefits-of-convertible-notes (“Convertible notes are financial
products which have been at the heart of the start-up scene for years.”).
139. Peter
Werner,
Frequently
Asked
Questions:
Convertible
Debt,
COOLEYGO
https://www.cooleygo.com/frequently-asked-questions-convertible-debt/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter
Werner—FAQs].
140. Werner—Primer, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. Here is the automatic conversion provision from a form term sheet posted by Fenwick & West LLP:
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from a high-quality future stock offering.144 A simple example is helpful for illustrating
the automatic conversion.
Example: TechCo issued convertible notes to a group of angels. Here are the key terms:
x
Principal amount: $500,000.
x
Maturity: The notes mature in eighteen months (the “Maturity Date”) unless repaid
or converted earlier.
x
Interest rate: The notes carry an interest rate of five percent per year. Unpaid
interest is added to the principal.
x
Automatic conversion: If, prior to the Maturity Date, TechCo consummates a
convertible preferred stock financing of at least $1 million, then the principal plus
unpaid interest automatically converts into shares of the convertible preferred stock.

Assume TechCo needs the money to cover manufacturing costs for its newly
developed product. Without the $500,000, TechCo could not produce and sell its product,
and would soon have to shut down. Obtaining the money provides TechCo with additional
time and resources to prove it can be a successful venture. Convertible notes give young
startups more runway to achieve important milestones, such as meaningful sales, that make
priced equity rounds more feasible and attractive. 145 To complete the example, assume
TechCo conducted a qualified equity financing after twelve months. TechCo raised $3
million in a Series A round at a $10 million pre-money valuation that translated into a $1
price per share. After one year, the outstanding principal plus interest for the notes would
be $525,000. Because TechCo consummated a qualified equity financing, the $525,000
automatically converts into Series A convertible preferred stock. Note holders will receive
525,000 shares (or $525,000/$1).
2. Change of Control

3. Notes Reach Maturity
What if the notes mature without a conversion having occurred? Notes can address
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prepayment could prevent them from converting the note in a financing, merger or asset sale.”).
144. Aaron Kellner, Convertible Note—Examples and How It Works, SEEDINVEST BLOG (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/startup-investing/how-convertible-notes-work; Meredith Turits, What Is a
Convertible Note and Should Your Startup Issue Them for Financing?, FUNDERA (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.fundera.com/blog/what-is-a-convertible-note; Scott Edward Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted
to Know About Convertible Note Seed Financings (But Were Afraid to Ask), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2012),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/07/convertible-note-seed-financings/; see also Werner—Primer, supra note
138.
145. See Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 158–61.
146. See
Convertible
Notes—Convertible
Notes
Primer,
FUNDERS CLUB : EDUC . CTR.,
https://fundersclub.com/learn/convertible-notes/convertible-notes-overview/convertible-note-acquisitionmerger/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
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Another common scenario is for the startup to be bought before a qualified equity
financing occurs. The notes should include a provision allowing for the note holders to
benefit from a change of control transaction. For example, holders may have the option of
(a) demanding immediate repayment plus a premium (e.g., 100 percent of the original
principal balance) or (b) converting their notes to common stock at a pre-set conversion
rate just before the change of control transaction is consummated.146
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this scenario in a few ways. Some notes may call for the issuer to repay immediately the
principal and interest on the notes, while others give the note holders the option of
demanding immediate repayment or converting the notes into equity at a pre-set
conversion rate.147 Because few startups have the cash to repay the notes, and calling the
notes could force the startup into bankruptcy and possible dissolution, noteholders
commonly agree to extend the maturity date and give the startup more time to find equity
investors.148 However, the threat of dissolution hangs over any convertible note deal.
4. Discounts and Valuation Caps
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147. Werner—FAQs, supra note 139. Receiving the option is the superior alternative for investors because it
prevents the startup from strategically delaying a financing or change of control transaction until after the
maturity date.
148. Id.
149. Werner—Primer, supra note 138.
150. See Hannah Bloomfield, The Basics of Convertible Notes: Convertible Note Terms, CAPSHARE BLOG
(July 13, 2018), https://www.capshare.com/blog/the-basics-of-convertible-notes-part-1-convertible-note-terms/
(“Convertible notes are a debt instrument and are legally required to carry interest. However, most of the time
the interest will be set to zero or the lowest interest rate legally required. Convertible notes can carry higher
interest rates, but it’s not the rule.”); see also Barry J. Kramer & Steven S. Levine, Seed Financing Survey 2012:
Internet/Digital Media and Software Industries, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Mar. 25, 2013),
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Seed-Finance-Survey-2012.aspx
[hereinafter
2012
Seed
Financing Survey], which found median interest rates on convertible notes of 6.0 percent, 5.5 percent, and 5.5
percent in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively.
151. Werner—Primer, supra note 138.
152. Id. This range assumes the notes also include a valuation cap. Discount rates are likely to be higher in
cases where there is no valuation cap.
153. Id.
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The above discussion left out two of the most hotly negotiated issues in most
convertible note deals: the discount and the valuation cap. Note holders invest before the
preferred stockholders, so they assume more risk. If the notes convert to preferred stock
without any adjustment (as in the above TechCo example), they are not compensated for
the additional risk.149 Note holders receive interest from the notes, but the interest rates
are usually too low to compensate for the additional risk.150 Therefore, note holders
usually insist on including a discount and a valuation cap in their notes.
x Discount. The discount grants note holders a price reduction when converting
their debt to equity in the qualified equity financing.151 If the notes include a
twenty percent discount and the qualified equity financing is priced at $1.00
per share, the note holders convert their notes to stock at $0.80 per share.
Discounts are commonly in the fifteen to twenty-five percent range.152
x Valuation cap. The valuation cap limits the price at which the notes convert
into equity. It sets a maximum value at which the convertible notes would
convert, “regardless of the actual value agreed to by the issuer and the new
equity investors.”153 If the valuation cap is $5 million, but the valuation from
the qualified equity financing is higher than $5 million, the notes convert at the
$5 million valuation.
Issuers prefer convertible notes without a discount or valuation cap, but investors
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normally receive both protections.154 Usually, the discount or the valuation cap applies
when converting the notes to equity, but not both.155 The note holders convert using
whichever method proves more favorable.
Example: Consider the above TechCo example, and assume the following additional facts:
x
Discount: The notes will convert at a twenty percent discount to the pre-money
valuation realized in the qualified equity financing.
x
Valuation cap: The notes have a pre-money valuation cap of $6 million.
Recall that TechCo conducted a qualified equity financing after twelve months, raising $3
million in a Series A preferred stock round at a $10 million pre-money valuation that
translated into a $1 price per share. The outstanding principal plus interest for the notes was
$525,000.
Discount calculation: The conversion formula calls for the notes to convert at a twenty
percent discount.
x
The $1 price per share must be reduced by the twenty percent discount (twenty
percent of $1 is $0.20), or $1 – $0.20 = $0.80. The note holders’ price per share is
$0.80.
x
The note holders will receive 656,250 shares (or $525,000/$0.80).
Valuation cap calculation: The valuation cap ($6 million) is lower than the actual valuation
($10 million), so the note holders’ price per share must be adjusted.
x
Step 1: Divide the valuation cap ($6 million) by the actual valuation ($10 million),
which equals sixty percent.
x
Step 2: Multiply the preferred stock price ($1) by the Step 1 percentage (sixty
percent), which results in an adjusted price per share of $0.60.
x
The note holders will receive 875,000 shares (or $525,000/$0.60).
In this case, the valuation cap calculation is more favorable for the note holders, so the notes
would convert using the valuation cap.

154. Id.; see also 2012 Seed Financing Survey, supra note 150, which found the following for 2010–12.
2010
67%

2011
83%

2012
90%

83%

82%

90%

155. Werner—Primer, supra note 138; Kellner, supra note 144.
156. See Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 164; see also Werner—Primer, supra note 138.
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Percentage of deals that convert at a discount to the next
equity round valuation
Percentage of deals in which valuation on conversion is
capped
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While convertible notes generally defer the need for a valuation analysis, discounts
and valuation caps partially reintroduce it. As noted above, these provisions try to account
for the note holders’ early-investment risk. Early forms of convertible notes mostly relied
on discounts. However, the note holders were often disappointed with the discount rate
when the startup proved very successful.156 Assume convertible note holders invested $1
million in a young startup. The notes carried a five percent interest rate and included a
twenty-five percent discount. But for the $1 million investment, the young startup would
not have been able to complete its product development and would have been forced to
shut down. One year later, the startup conducted a Series A preferred stock round.
x It raised $25 million from a venture capital syndicate at a $50 million premoney valuation and a $5 price per share. The venture capital syndicate owns
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5 million shares of Series A preferred stock, representing roughly 33.3 percent
of the company.
x The startup did not make any principal or interest payments, so the outstanding
principal plus interest for the notes was $1,050,000.
x The note holders receive 280,000 shares of Series A preferred stock (or
$1,050,000/$3.75), which represents less than two percent of the company.
The note holders are undoubtedly happy the startup succeeded, and their investment
was positive. At the same time, they are probably disappointed that they own less than two
percent of the startup despite their investment being a condition precedent to its success.
This type of outcome led to valuation caps becoming a common feature for convertible
debt.157 Consider the outcome if the note holders had obtained a pre-money valuation cap
of $10 million.
x The notes’ conversion price would be $1 per share. This comes from dividing
the valuation cap by the actual valuation ($10 million/$50 million or twenty
percent) and multiplying the preferred stock share price ($5) by that percentage.
x The note holders would receive 1,050,000 shares of Series A preferred stock,
which represents almost 7 percent of the company.
The valuation cap involves a value judgment. The issuer wants to set the valuation
cap at a high amount, while investors want a low amount. However, it does not appear that
issuers or investors use formal valuation analyses (such as a DCF or a First Chicago
method analysis) to inform this decision.158 Instead, the parties are more likely to use
informal methods. The issuer wants to avoid the cap being so low that it deters future
investors from buying into a qualified equity financing (because they feel the note holders
are receiving too much).159 And the note holders want to protect themselves from
receiving too little of the company if the qualified equity financing generates a favorable
valuation.160 One solution is to run a number of scenarios that allow the issuer and the
investors to see the potential outcomes as they try to reach an agreement (see Table 2).
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 76 Side B
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157. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 164.
158. See, e.g., Tom Wilson, Valuation Caps, MEDIUM (Jan. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@taw/valuationcaps-ee7918aa6d13.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Table 2
Simplified Sample Valuation Cap Scenario Analysis
Assumption:
x
Note holders purchased $1 million of convertible notes that do not accrue interest.
Qualified Equity
Financing Assumptions

Note Holders’ %
Ownership
after the Qualified
Equity Financing

Founders’ % Ownership
after the Qualified
Equity Financing

Valuation
Cap

Pre-Money
Valuation

Amount
Invested

Without the
Valuation
Cap

With the
Valuation
Cap

Without the
Valuation
Cap

With the
Valuation
Cap

$8 million

$10 million

$5 million

6.3%

7.7%

62.5%

61.5%

$8 million

$10 million $10 million

4.8%

5.9%

47.6%

47.1%

$8 million

$20 million

$5 million

3.8%

9.1%

76.9%

72.7%

$8 million

$20 million $10 million

3.2%

7.7%

64.5%

61.5%

$8 million

$30 million

$5 million

2.8%

9.7%

83.3%

77.4%

$8 million

$30 million $10 million

2.4%

8.6%

73.2%

68.6%

$5 million

6.3%

6.3%

62.5%

62.5%

$10 million $10 million $10 million

4.8%

4.8%

47.6%

47.6%

$10 million $20 million

$5 million

3.8%

7.4%

76.9%

74.1%

$10 million $20 million $10 million

3.2%

6.3%

64.5%

62.5%

$10 million $30 million

$5 million

2.8%

7.9%

83.3%

78.9%

$10 million $30 million $10 million

2.4%

7.0%

73.2%

69.8%

$12 million $10 million

$10 million $10 million

6.3%

6.3%

62.5%

62.5%

4.8%

4.8%

47.6%

47.6%

$12 million $20 million

$5 million

3.8%

6.3%

76.9%

75.0%

$12 million $20 million $10 million

3.2%

5.3%

64.5%

63.2%

$12 million $30 million

$5 million

2.8%

6.7%

83.3%

80.0%

$12 million $30 million $10 million

2.4%

5.9%

73.2%

70.6%

For investors, the valuation cap analysis is much simpler than what is required for a
priced equity transaction and can be accomplished without performance projections.
Rather than determine the investment’s intrinsic value, investors can reasonably limit their
analysis to determining how much they are willing to leave on the table if the investment
proves to be very successful, which can be accomplished with tools like Table 2.

As noted earlier, venture capital firms use a sophisticated contract strategy involving
convertible preferred stock to reduce uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
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5. Control Rights
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problems that plague startups.161 Receiving control rights is a focal point of that strategy.
Venture capital firms commonly obtain substantial control over the startup by demanding
board seats and special voting rights as part of their investment. Convertible notes
generally do not provide their holders with such control rights. Board seats and class voting
rights are not typically part of a convertible note deal.162 Moreover, note holders are not
shareholders until the notes convert. Therefore, they do not receive fiduciary duty or other
state shareholder protections until their notes convert.163
Convertible notes take a different approach to the control issue. Rather than directly
grant their holders control rights, convertible notes push the startup to conduct a qualified
equity financing with sophisticated investors. The note holders then piggyback on the
rights given to the sophisticated investors. The notes’ maturity date establishes a firm date
by which the startup must conduct a qualified equity financing, or risk possible
bankruptcy, and the notes’ qualified equity financing definition ensures the subsequent
investors are appropriately sophisticated and will insist on a proper level of controls and
protections.
B. Alternatives to Convertible Notes
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Y K
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161. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
162. Walker, supra note 144; see 2012 Seed Financing Survey, supra note 150. The survey found:
x
Board seats were granted in 72.5 percent, 70 percent, and 73 percent of preferred stock seed
financings in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively.
x
Board seats granted in 8.3 percent, 4 percent, and 0 percent of convertible note seed financings in
2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. Id.
163. Bernthal, supra note 8, at 806.
164. Paul Graham, the founder of Y Combinator announced in a 2010 tweet, “Convertible notes have won.
Every investment so far in this YC batch (and there have been a lot) has been done on a convertible note. ”
Paul Graham (@paulg), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2010, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com/paulg/status/22319113993.
While Y Combinator subsequently switched to safes as its investment instrument of choice, see infra Part III.B,
many early investors have continued to use convertible notes and made them a mainstream funding instrument
for young startups.
165. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 165.
166. Werner—FAQs, supra note 139.
167. See Y COMBINATOR, SAFE USER GUIDE 4 (Sept. 2018), https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/
[hereinafter SAFE USER GUIDE] (scroll down the page and select the Safe User Guide link).
168. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 166.
169. See, e.g., supra note 38.
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By 2010, convertible notes had become a crucial financial instrument for funding
young-startups.164 However, the notes’ debt features were not viewed favorably by
everyone.165 The maturity date is often the biggest problem. Convertible notes should only
be used when the young startup and the potential note investors can confidently project
conducting a Series A round soon. For young startups that need significant development
before they are ready for a Series A round, convertible notes may not give them enough
time. While maturity dates can be extended,166 the negotiations can take time and energy
and generate significant legal fees.167 Keeping track of accrued interest payments can also
be a nuisance168 and increase legal costs. Finally, convertible notes can trigger state
lending regulations that limit flexibility169 and, once again, increase legal fees. To address
these concerns, investors and their attorneys developed alternatives to convertible notes.
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The developers’ goal was to preserve the note’s deferred-equity features while eliminating
its repayment obligations. Safes and the KISS are two popular alternatives. 170
1. Safes
Carolyn Levy, a Y Combinator partner (and lawyer), is credited with inventing the
first safe in 2013.171 Y Combinator launched the first accelerator program in Cambridge,
Massachusetts during 2005172 and continues to be one of the most prestigious accelerators
and seed investors.
A safe is an investment contract that converts to stock if a triggering event, such as
a qualified equity financing, occurs.173 Like convertible notes, safes allow investors to
acquire stock in a future priced equity round while deferring valuation to that future round.
And like convertible notes, safes routinely contain discounts and valuation caps.174
However, unlike convertible notes, safes are not debt and do not require repayment. Since
there is no repayment obligation, safes generally give startups unlimited time before
needing to accomplish a qualified equity financing.175 Thus, in addition to eliminating the
administrative requirements that come with a debt instrument, safes do not put young
startups on the clock for conducting a qualified equity financing. This expands the number
of young startups that can use the instrument.
a. Conversions

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

170. See generally Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 45–48; Bernthal, supra note 8, at 806–09.
171. See supra note 10.
172. Ian Hathaway, What Startup Accelerators Really Do, H ARV. BUS . REV. (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/03/what-startup-accelerators-really-do.
173. See SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, 8–13. Y Combinator’s safe forms are available at
https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/ [hereinafter Y Combinator’s Safe Forms]; see also SEC Investor
Bulletin, supra note 14.
174. Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 46.
175. SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 4. But see Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, which conducted
a survey of startup lawyers in the United States and Canada regarding the types of investment contracts they see
in the early-stage startup finance space. The survey found that some startup lawyers “like to add a maturity date
to the SAFE.” Id. at 58.
176. For example, Y Combinator’s version of the safe does not include a minimum size threshold when
defining an “Equity Financing,” which is its version of a qualified equity financing. Y Combinator’s Safe Forms,
supra note 173.
177. Id.
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Safes have comparable conversion mechanisms to those found in convertible notes
with a qualified equity financing remaining the baseline conversion scenario. If the startup
raises capital by selling preferred stock in a priced round, the safes automatically convert
into preferred stock. However, safes generally do not include a minimum size threshold
when defining a qualified equity financing.176 Any priced preferred stock round triggers
an automatic conversion.
Safes also typically include a liquidity event provision if the issuer is sold or
conducts an IPO before a qualified equity financing occurs. The liquidity event provisions
grant the safe holders the right to stock or cash in those circumstances.177 Finally, if the
company liquidates before a conversion event, safe holders are given a claim on the
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startup’s residual up to the amount they invested. 178
b. Discounts, Valuation Caps, and the Post-Money Safe
Safes routinely include a discount and valuation cap. The argument for including
discounts and valuation caps is even stronger for safes than for convertible notes since safe
holders do not have the protection of a debt claim against the startup and may have to wait
longer for a qualified equity financing. The valuation analysis for determining a safe’s
discount and/or valuation cap should be comparable to that for a convertible note.
Although if the safe carries more risk, a higher discount and/or lower valuation cap is
justified.
In 2018, Y Combinator introduced a post-money safe that alters investors’ valuation
cap analysis somewhat.179 The original safes were pre-money safes.180 The valuation cap
for pre-money safes, as well as most convertible notes, is based on the qualified equity
financing’s pre-money valuation. Pre-money valuation is a company’s agreed valuation
before an investment. Assume an investor buys stock representing twenty-five percent
ownership in a company for $5 million. The company’s post-money valuation is $20
million (or $5 million/twenty-five percent). However, its pre-money valuation is $15
million, which is calculated as the post-money valuation minus the investment.
A post-money valuation cap gives safe investors more certainty about their future
ownership percentage and insulates them from dilution risk from future safe rounds and
the size of the qualified equity financing.181 While the post-money versus pre-money safe

Table A
Pre-money
valuation

$10 million
$10 million
$10 million

Amount
invested in
qualified
equity
financing
$5 million
$7.5 million
$10 million

Post-money
valuation

New
investor
shares
(assumes
$1 per
share)

Implied
founder
shares

Safe
Shares
Safe
conversion issued to Investor %
rate
Safe
ownership
(cap/pre- Investor
money
valuation)
$15 million
5 million 10 million
0.5
500,000
3.2%
$17.5 million 7.5 million 10 million
0.5
500,000
2.8%
$20 million
10 million 10 million
0.5
500,000
2.4%
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If, however, the valuation cap is a post-money cap, the Safe Investor’s ownership percentage in TechCo will not
change so long as the post-money valuation exceeds the cap. Assume the same facts as above except the safes
included a $10 million post-money valuation cap (see Table B).
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178. Id.
179. See Carolyn Levy, Safe Financing Documents, Y COMBINATOR (Sept. 2018),
https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/.
180. Id.
181. Example: TechCo issued an original round of safes to an accelerator (the “Safe Investor”). The Safe
Investor purchased $250,000 of safes that included a $5 million pre-money valuation cap. TechCo did not issue
any further safe rounds and eventually conducted a qualified equity financing at a $10 million pre-money
valuation. The Safe Investor’s ownership percentage in TechCo will be a function of how much money is raised
in the qualified equity financing (see Table A).
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distinction is important for issuers and investors,182 it does not change a safe’s
fundamental features. Both safe versions are deferred-equity instruments that derive their
value from future stock issuances. Valuing the underlying preferred stock requires
projecting the startup’s future operating performance and assessing the risk associated with
that performance, and both safe forms allow the startup and its safe investors to defer that
valuation to a future qualified equity financing. Finally, the analysis required to determine
the valuation cap is comparable for the pre-money and post-money versions.
What may be most important about the post-money safe is what it demonstrates
about Specialized Startup Investors’ strength and sophistication. The post-money
valuation feature is very pro-investor. It protects the safe investors from subsequent
dilution and causes the founders (and other common stock holders) to absorb any dilution
the Specialized Startup Investors avoid.183 Some Specialized Startup Investors felt they
were not getting a good enough deal from their safe investments, so they modified the
standard form to improve their deal at the expense of the issuers’ founders.
c. Less Protections
Safes generally offer holders less protections than convertible notes. Safes are not
current equity shares, so the default rule is that they do not provide holders with voting
rights. The parties can contractually grant the safe investors special control rights, such as
board seats or class voting rights, but that does not appear to be the norm.184 Moreover,
because safes are not debt and do not require repayment, they lack the inherent control
associated with convertible notes. There is no maturity date to push the startup to conduct
a qualified equity financing, nor is there the cudgel of potentially calling the notes to
encourage the startup’s management team to take advice. This reduced control, when
coupled with the fact young startups sell safes earlier in their life cycle than convertible
notes, often justifies a higher discount and/or lower valuation cap.

Amount
Post-money
New
invested in valuation
investor
qualified
shares
equity
(assumes $1
financing
per share)

$10 million $5 million $15 million
5 million
$10 million $7.5 million $17.5 million 7.5 million
$10 million $10 million $20 million 10 million

Implied
founder
shares

10 million
10 million
10 million

Safe
conversion
rate
(cap/postmoney
valuation)
0.667
0.571
0.5

Shares
Safe
issued to Investor %
Safe
ownership
Investor

375,000
437,000
500,000

2.4%
2.4%
2.4%
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182. See, e.g., SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 1–6 for a discussion of the advantages of the post-money
safe; José Ancer, Why Startups Shouldn’t Use YC’s Post-Money SAFE, SILICON HILLS LAW. (May 1, 2019),
https://siliconhillslawyer.com/2019/05/01/startups-shouldnt-use-yc-post-money-safe/, for an explanation of
disadvantages the post-money safe presents to issuers.
183. SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 1–6; Ancer, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., José Ancer, Pre-Series A Startup Boards, MEDIUM (May 17, 2017),
https://austinstartups.com/pre-series-a-startup-boards-a309f1dd533f (“The majority of companies we see have
Founders only on the Board before closing their Series A.”).
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2. The KISS
500 Startups, another prestigious startup accelerator, decided to establish its own
deferred-equity instruments in 2014 to compete with convertible notes and safes. 500
Startups’ instruments are called the KISS (the Keep It Simple Security). There are two
versions of the KISS. There is a debt version, which includes a maturity date and interest
rate,185 that is comparable to a convertible note.186 And there is an equity version187 that
is like a safe.188 The two KISS versions raise the same valuation issues as convertible
notes and safes. This article treats the debt version of the KISS as though it is functionally
identical to a convertible note and the equity version of the KISS as though it is
functionally identical to a safe.
C. Valuation Deferral and Investor Cash Flows
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185. Raiten, supra note 11.
186. Giorgia Coltella, SAFE v. KISS, the Evolution of the Convertible Note, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vs-kiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d; Coyle & Green
(2018), supra note 7, at 47.
187. Raiten, supra note 11.
188. Coltella, supra note 186; Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 48.
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Deferred-equity instruments provide young startups and their investors with an
important advantage. At a time when a reasonable valuation determination may not be
possible, deferred equity allows the parties to defer valuation to a future funding round
when the startup is more mature and easier to value. The ultimate investment goal remains
the same: purchase future cash flows with a present value greater than the investment’s
purchase price. However, the process for identifying and measuring the future cash flows
changes. Instead of projecting the startup’s future operating performance to run a DCF or
other valuation analysis, investors focus on whether the startup will conduct a qualified
equity financing. The cash flow and valuation progression can be broken down as follows:
x Qualified equity financing triggers an automatic conversion. If the
qualified equity financing (or Series A round) occurs, the notes/safes convert
to equity based on the Series A round valuation (as adjusted by the discount or
valuation cap). The conversion does not generate immediate cash flows for the
investor, but receiving the preferred stock makes future cash flows more
probable.
x Future cash flows come from a future exit event. The future cash flows come
from the startup achieving an IPO exit or acquisition exit, at which point the
former note/safe holders (now preferred stockholders) can cash out their stock.
x Preferred stockholders value the future cash flows. When the prospective
preferred stockholders value the startup for the Series A round, they value the
future cash flows available to preferred stockholders at this later date when
there is more information. The startup should have operating results by this
point and there should be less uncertainty about its future. The stock price in
the qualified equity financing should reflect the present value of the cash flows
those shares project to receive. The note holders take the price set by the Series
A round investors (as adjusted by the discount or valuation cap).
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Projecting whether a young startup will successfully conduct a qualified equity
financing should be manageable for Specialized Startup Investors. It does not require
generating detailed performance projections. It should only require identifying whether a
young startup has the characteristics of successful startups that tend to attract venture
capital investors in priced rounds and is only missing proven sales. This is not to suggest
that predicting whether a young startup will conduct a future qualified equity financing is
a trivial matter. However, it is a determination that Specialized Startup Investors should
be able to make and is easier than developing highly uncertain valuation models for
companies with no operating history.
Deferred equity works in the traditional startup market because of the type of issuers
and investors that populate the market. The instruments are designed to pay off if the
startup raises institutional venture capital, so having a pool of venture-capital eligible
issuers is a condition precedent to these instruments serving their function. Having highquality investors, such as venture capital firms, for the Series A is also a condition
precedent. The note holders entrust the valuation function to those subsequent investors,
so there must be a pool of investors who can thoughtfully value the startup once it reaches
the Series A round. If the subsequent investors are not competent valuers, the model
completely breaks down. Because the traditional startup market has both conditions
precedent—venture-capital eligible issuers and high-quality Series A investors—the
deferred-equity instruments allow risky, young startups to raise much needed capital
without transferring an improper level of that risk to investors.
IV. ARE DEFERRED-EQUITY INSTRUMENTS RIGHT FOR EVERYONE? CROWDFUNDING AND
DEFERRED-EQUITY
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189. It is reasonable to assume that all (or essentially all) safes and convertible notes qualify as securities under
federal and state law. Safes should qualify as “investment contracts,” which are defined as securities under federal
and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (federal definition); and see section 401(m) of the Uniform Securities Act
of 1956 for an example of the state definition. An instrument is an investment contract where there is an (1)
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with an expectation of profits; and (4) those profits are to
come solely from the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). Convertible notes
should also qualify as investment contracts. Moreover, the convertible notes are “notes,” which are defined as
securities under federal and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (federal definition); and see section 401(m) of the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 for an example of the state definition. UNIF . SECURITIES ACT § 401(m) (1956).
There are several categories of notes that are not securities, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64–68 (1990),
but convertible notes do not fit within any of those categories nor do they have a resemblance to any of the nonsecurity categories of notes.
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Improving capital access for young startups is a critical matter for policymakers, and
deferred-equity instruments have been a positive addition to the classic seed investing
market. But are they right for everyone?
So far, this article has discussed deferred-equity instruments as financial instruments
and contracts. However, they also qualify as securities.189 As a result, when issuers offer
and sell deferred-equity instruments to investors, they must comply with federal and state
securities laws. Historically, companies have had two paths for selling their securities.
x Path 1—heavily regulated public offering. Companies can sell securities to
the public (accessing its immense capital resources) but must first register the
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190. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. To register a transaction, the issuer must file a registration statement with the SEC.
Registration statements provide detailed information about the issuer and the offering.
191. See, e.g., Securities Act section 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2), and Rule 506(b) and (c) of Regulation D,
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) and (c).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1).
193. Historically, securities intermediaries must generally register as brokers. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). The JOBS
Act, through Securities Act section 4(a)(6)(C), introduced a new category of registered securities intermediary,
a “funding portal,” for section 4(a)(6) crowdfunding transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C). Regulation CF Rule
100(a)(3) implements section 4(a)(6)(C)’s funding portal provision. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3).
194. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2).
195. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201–03.
196. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 169, 177–80; SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 14.
197. The Crowd SAFE, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Mar. 8, 2020); Simple Agreement
for Future Equity (SAFE), WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/securities#SAFE (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
198. See Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13.
199. Joe Green, Commentary: SEC Rightly Concerned about ‘So-called SAFE’ Securities in Crowdfunding,
REUTERS (June 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-crowdfunding-safe-idUSKBN18S63M.
200. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 174.
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transaction190 and submit to substantial SEC oversight. While costly, heavy
regulation helps reduce the public’s exposure to fraud and improper risk.
x Path 2—lightly regulated private offering. Companies can sell securities in
cheaper private offerings. Since the public faces less exposure, less regulation
is needed. However, the companies’ access to capital is limited. The most
common limitation is to restrict companies to selling to sophisticated investors
who do not need the protections afforded by registration.191 When Specialized
Startup Investors purchase classic deferred-equity instruments, those are Path
2 transactions.
Regulation CF provides issuers with an additional option. Issuers can raise up to
$1,070,000 from the public in a twelve-month period192 in a transaction that is regulated
less heavily than a registered offering, but more heavily than a private offering. A
Regulation CF transaction must be conducted exclusively through a broker or registered
funding portal,193 and the amount sold to any individual investor is subject to purchase
limitations of $2,200 to $107,000 based on the investor’s annual income and net worth.194
Issuers and funding portals (or brokers) must satisfy several investor safeguards, such as
providing investors, and potential investors, with detailed disclosure at the time of the
offering and on an annual basis thereafter.195
It was not long after Regulation CF took effect that crowdfunding issuers began
using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from public investors. 196 In fact,
Republic and Wefunder both have their own safe templates.197 Joseph Green and John
Coyle investigated the practice of crowdfunded safes and wrote a December 2016 essay,
Crowdfunding and the Not-so-SAFE SAFE.198 The authors had two main concerns. First,
safes are designed for issuers that are expected to conduct priced venture capital rounds in
the near future. However, the authors believed “exceedingly few of the crowdfunding
companies would actually be able to do so.”199 This skepticism came from two factors.
Venture capital firms favor technology companies with high-growth trajectories.200 Many
of the crowdfunding issuers were “[n]on-tech startups with business models that are less
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201. Id.
202. Id. at 175.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 169.
205. SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 14.
206. One caveat about the data collection: The funding amounts for some of the Wefunder deals may be
exaggerated. Each of the portals provides a list of funded companies, how much each issuer raised, and how
many investors it attracted. However, when Wefunder lists this information, it appears to aggregate all the deals
the issuer has ever done on Wefunder. As a result, some of the 2019 Wefunder deals in the Study may have
exaggerated dollar amounts. This author tried to clear up the problem by reviewing each issuer’s Form C-U. Per
Regulation CF Rule 203(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(a)(3), each issuer must file a Form C-U disclosing the total
amount of securities sold in the offering within five business days after the offering deadline. However, few of
the Wefunder issuers that completed a Regulation CF offering during the Study filed their Form C-U. This author
believes the exaggerated numbers only affected a small number of the Wefunder deals and does not materially
affect the overall numbers. For a few of the Wefunder deals, the reported funding amount exceeded the maximum
offering size stated on the issuer’s Form C. In those cases, the Study replaced the reported funding amount with
the maximum offering size listed on the Form C.
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likely to attract VC investment.”201 For the issuers that were technology startups and had
“business models which, at first blush, would appear attractive to VC investors,”202 the
authors believed they suffered from an adverse selection problem. Due to the higher costs
and additional disclosure requirements for Regulation CF offerings, high-growth
technology startups should prefer raising capital from Specialized Startup Investors in the
traditional startup market. These issuers only turn to Regulation CF offerings “because
they have no other options, and they may still struggle to raise traditional venture financing
down the road.”203 In addition to their issuer concerns, Green and Coyle were also
concerned that the safes contained “terms that are likely to frustrate the ability of investors
to share in the upside of successful crowdfunding companies.”204 A few months after the
Green and Coyle essay, the SEC issued an investor bulletin urging issuers to be “[c]autious
of SAFES in [c]rowdfunding.”205
Despite these concerns, crowdfunding issuers have continued to issue deferredequity instruments unabated. Is that good or bad? On one hand, valuation deferral could
benefit any young startup and its investors regardless of the forum used to raise the capital.
On the other hand, using deferred-equity instruments in the crowdfunding setting may be
improper due to the types of issuers conducting crowdfunding offerings and the investors’
sophistication level. Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings could expose
unsophisticated investors to an inappropriate level of risk. To get a clearer picture of the
issue, this author examined all the Regulation CF deals funded through the Republic,
StartEngine, and Wefunder portals during 2019. These three funding portals were chosen
because they are three of the most popular portals and because Republic and Wefunder
have developed their own forms of deferred-equity interests and are therefore closely
associated with deferred-equity.
The Study captured 205 funded deals, of which seventy-one were safe offerings and
twenty-two were convertible note offerings (see Table 5). The ninety-three deferred-equity
deals totaled $30.6 million, with an average deal size of $331,891 and a median deal size
of $200,240.206
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Table 5
Summary of Deals Funded During 2019
Republic
Safes
Number of deals
36
Total funding amount
$13,227,829
Average
$367,440
Median
$171,742
Convertible notes
Number of deals
—
Total funding amount
—
Average
—
Median
—
Equity (common or
preferred)
Number of deals
—
Total funding amount
—
Average
—
Median
—
Other
Number of deals
4
Total funding amount
$496,740
Average
$124,185
Median
$147,124

[Vol. 55:469

StartEngine

Wefunder

—
—
—
—

35
$11,911,098
$340,317
$229,573

7
$510,730
$72,961
$74,980

15
$4,982,722
$332,181
$288,547

68
$19,562,265
$287,680
$59,399

23
$10,065,548
$437,633
$279,787

6
$1,098,465
$183,078
$103,369

11
$2,326,872
$211,534
$170,726

A. The Issuers

207. Venture capital firms want companies with a potential to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, or
better yet billions of dollars. This requires large markets that present many years of large profit/free cash flow
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The Study lends support to Green’s and Coyle’s concern about crowdfunding
issuers’ ability to conduct future, priced venture capital rounds. Venture capital firms
generally invest in technology startups with business models that address large market
opportunities and suggest a rapid-growth future.207 First, many of the ninety-three
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The Study examined the deferred-equity issuers and the terms of their instruments.
Based on that review, this author concludes that most of the deferred-equity offerings in
the Study are very risky investments that do not appear to offer investors enough upside
potential to offset the risk. More specifically, this author concludes:
x Most of the issuers appear unlikely ever to raise money from venture capital
firms.
x The instruments’ terms are very issuer friendly. The instruments are far more
favorable to issuers than one would expect for such high-risk investments.
x The issuer-friendly terms raise concerns that Regulation CF investors lack the
sophistication to understand and internalize the risks and terms of their
investments.
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opportunities for the startup.
208. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 175–76.
209. Id. at 175.
210. See generally Michael Maximilian Mödl, Is Wisdom of the Crowd a Positive Signal? Effects of
Crowdfinancing on Subsequent Venture Capital Selection, MAX PLANCK I NSTIT. FOR INNOVATION &
COMPETITION 10–12, 25–29 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3222461.
211. Id. at 26–27.
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deferred-equity issuers were not technology companies. Roughly one-quarter of the issuers
were in the food industry (including healthy cookie companies, specialty beer or spirit
producers, catering companies, and grocery delivery companies), apparel and beauty
industry, or other similar nontechnology sectors. Green and Coyle explained that
nontechnology companies “are less likely to be candidates for VC investment and more
likely to evolve into either lifestyle businesses for the founders . . . or companies that rely
on debt financing (such as bank loans) and reinvested profits to support additional
growth.”208 Even among the technology issuers, many appear to lack venture capital-style
business plans or growth potential. For example, there are issuers providing outsourced
3D printing services, foreign-language teaching services, and several niche eCommerce
websites and phone apps. Predicting whether venture capital firms will invest in a
particular issuer is an admittedly subjective call. However, many of the issuers simply do
not appear to be venture capital-style companies.
Green and Coyle were concerned that even those issuers that arguably have business
models and growth trajectories that may interest venture capital firms will suffer from an
adverse selection problem if they conduct a Regulation CF deferred-equity offering.209
Regulation CF is a funding option of last resort for such technology companies, meaning
the offering signals to future venture capital investors that these issuers are not strong
companies worthy of investment.210 A recent study focused on the German venture capital
market explains, “there is strong indication that venture investors perceive crowd money
as a negative signal for a start-up’s overall quality and therefore have a lower preference
for selecting such-funded firms for further due diligence.”211 Raising a Regulation CF
round could discourage venture capital firms from even considering such issuers for future
funding rounds.
The Study could not directly measure the presence of an adverse selection problem,
but it could consider the issuers’ financial results to see if they shed some light on whether
the companies are likely to be attractive venture capital candidates in the future. Of the
ninety-three deferred-equity issuers, most lacked substantial revenues and were
unprofitable (see Tables 6 and 7). The lack of revenues and profits should not be
surprising. Deferred-equity instruments are intended for young startups that, by definition,
lack meaningful operating histories. What is somewhat surprising is the number of issuers
with revenue above $500,000 (or even $1 million), as well as the number of issuers that
generated profits in their most recent fiscal years. There were eighteen different issuers
that either generated more than $500,000 of revenues or $50,000 of net income during
their most recently completed fiscal year. While having a meaningful operating history is
normally a positive factor, it may not be in the deferred-equity setting. Deferred equity
allows issuers and their investors to defer valuation because such companies lack the
meaningful operating histories required for traditional valuation analysis. Once a company
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has a meaningful operating history, a traditional valuation analysis should generally be
possible, thus raising questions about why some of these issuers chose to use deferredequity interests for their funding event.
Table 6
Revenues for deferred-equity issuers in most recent fiscal year before offering
Number of
Average
Median
Issuers
Revenues
Revenues
All issuers
93
$407,648
$30,940
Issuer with no revenues
32
$0
$0
Issuers with revenues above $0 and up
38
$79,599
$51,186
to $250,000
Issuers with revenues above $250,000
8
$379,625
$374,540
and up to $500,000
Issuers with revenues above $500,000
4
$690,850
$688,841
and up to $1 million
Issuers with revenues above $1 million
11
$2,638,011
$1,920,425
Table 7
Profits (losses) for deferred-equity issuers in most recent fiscal year before offering
Number of
Average Profits Median Profits
Issuers
(Losses)
(Losses)
All issuers
93
($367,286)
($76,232)
Issuers without net income
81
($444,518)
($143,501)
Issuers with net income
12
$89,511
$15,205

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

212. Tony Lettich, Why Startup Investors Hate Debt, LAUNCHOPEDIA BY FUNDINGSAGE (July 8, 2019),
https://fundingsage.com/why-startup-investors-hate-debt/.
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The most surprising financial data was the issuers’ debt levels. Startups seeking to
raise their first formal venture capital round are normally not burdened by significant
debt.212 This makes intuitive sense because the venture capital firms want their investment
dollars to fund growth, not repay creditors. The issuers in the Study, however, exhibited
significant debt levels (see Table 8). Twenty-six of the issuers, or thirty percent, had
combined short-term and long-term debt exceeding $500,000 in their most recent fiscal
year. Having substantial debt would not be troubling if the issuer also had substantial assets
to offset the debt. This was generally not the case for the issuers in the Study. Over sixty
percent of the issuers with debt above $500,000 had debt obligations that were at least
twice the amount of their total assets, and seven of those issuers had debt obligations that
were at least ten-times the amount of their total assets. It is difficult to imagine venture
capital firms investing in companies with that type of debt profile.
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Another indication that many of the issuers will likely struggle to conduct a future
venture round is their prior capital raising history. Two-thirds of the issuers in the Study
had raised at least one convertible note and/or safe round in the three years preceding their
Regulation CF offering (see Table 9). And many of those prior rounds were significant.
The bigger the prior offerings, the more claims on the startup’s equity if a future venture
capital round occurs. These additional claims can discourage venture capital investment
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Table 8
Short-term + long-term debt for deferred-equity issuers in most recent fiscal year
before offering
Number
Average
Median Debt
Number
Number
of
Debt
of Issuers of Issuers
Issuers
with Debt with Debt
at least 2x
at least
their
10x their
Total
Total
Assets
Assets
All issuers
93
$565,782
$165,000
30
11
Issuers with
19
$0
$0
0
0
no shortterm or
long-term
debt
Issuers with
35
$85,198
$66,246
10
3
short-term +
long-term
debt from $0
to $250,000
Issuers with
13
$369,489
$371,847
4
1
short-term +
long-term
debt from
$250,001 to
$500,000
Issuers with
12
$747,065
$750,811
7
3
short-term +
long-term
debt from
$500,001 to
$1 million
Issuers with
14
$2,561,977
$1,787,197
9
4
short-term +
long-term
debt above
$1 million
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because they mean the venture capital firm has to share the company’s future cash flows
with more parties. Prior convertible offerings also create more complex ownership
structures for a venture capital firm to sift through, which is not an attractive feature.
Finally, most of the prior convertible offerings were for larger sums than the 2019
Regulation CF offering. This does not paint a picture of thriving companies that are
ascending the capital-raising food chain to attract more money from deeper pockets.
Rather, it paints a picture of issuers that are becoming less popular and having to settle for
capital wherever they can find it, which does not bode well for future venture capital
rounds.

B. The Instruments’ Terms

1. Safes
The seventy-one safe deals were split roughly evenly between the Wefunder and
Republic portals. Each funding portal provides issuers with its own template for a safe.
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The Study also examined the terms of the deferred-equity instruments issued in the
ninety-three Regulation CF offerings.
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Table 9
Deferred-equity issuers with prior convertible note or safe offerings in the three
years before the Regulation CF offering
Number
Average
Median
Number of Issuers
of
Amount
Amount
raising less from
Issuers
Raised
Raised
current Reg CF
offering than in
their prior
deferred-equity
offerings
All issuers that
61
$843,585
$360,000
31
conducted a prior
deferred-equity offering
Issuers that raised up to
35
$180,272
$175,000
10
$500,000 in prior
deferred-equity
offerings
Issuers that raised
9
$715,974
$684,000
5
above $500,000 and up
to $1 million in prior
deferred-equity
offerings
Issuers that raised
17
$2,276,787 $1,699,029
16
above $1 million in
prior deferred-equity
offerings
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213. If the valuation cap is significantly below the subsequent equity financing’s valuation, the safe holders
would receive a liquidation preference that far exceeds what they invested in the company.
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Example: Assume TechCo sold $200,000 of safes to an accelerator (the “Safe Investor”). The safes
include a $5 million post-money valuation cap. TechCo subsequently sells preferred stock in a
qualified equity financing. The qualified equity financing has a $10 million post-money valuation that
translates into a $1 price per share. This means the Safe Investor’s safes will convert into 400,000
shares of preferred stock.
x
The safes’ conversion price is $0.50 per share, which comes from dividing the valuation cap
by the actual valuation ($5 million/$10 million) and multiplying the preferred stock price ($1)
by that percentage.
x
The Safe Investor’s $200,000 investment multiplied by $0.50 per share equates to 400,000
shares.
The preferred stock from the qualified equity financing includes a liquidation preference. Each share
of preferred stock has a $1 liquidation preference. If TechCo liquidates, the preferred stockholders
get their investment back before common stockholders receive anything. If the Safe Investor receives
400,000 shares of preferred stock, it receives a $400,000 liquidation preference despite investing only
$200,000.
This excess liquidation preference would be a windfall for the safe holders, so the shadow stock often limits the
liquidation preference to the safe holders’ investment amount.
214. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 174.
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Wefunder has the “Wefunder SAFE” and Republic has the “Crowd SAFE.” Both
templates are based on the Y Combinator safe. A standard Y Combinator safe converts in
two main instances:
(1) Equity financing. If the issuer raises capital by selling preferred stock in a
priced round (with no minimum size threshold), the safe automatically converts
to a shadow stock that is identical to the issued preferred stock with a few
exceptions (such as the liquidation preference).213
(2) Liquidity event. If the issuer sells itself or conducts an IPO (a “liquidity event”)
before a preferred stock round occurs, the safe holders automatically receive the
greater of (a) the purchase price originally paid for the safes or (b) a cash amount
based on converting the safes into common stock immediately before the
liquidity event at the defined conversion ratio. The safe holders may also have
the choice to receive their consideration in stock.
The Y Combinator safe does have a loophole that issuers could exploit, which this
article refers to as the “Common Stock Loophole.” The equity financing conversion is only
triggered by a future preferred stock round, not by a common stock round. Issuers could
theoretically use the Common Stock Loophole to avoid conversion until a liquidity event
by only doing common stock rounds. However, such an outcome is unlikely in the
traditional startup market because priced venture capital rounds almost always involve
preferred stock. Exploiting the loophole would require finding venture capital investors
willing to take common stock, which is doubtful. Moreover, exploiting the loophole
violates the spirit of the safe agreement, which would hurt the issuer’s (and its managers’)
reputation. Traditional startups operate in a “clubby” world214 where reputations are
important to obtaining funding. Young startups that raise capital from Specialized Startup
Investors are the types of companies that can also tap the formal venture capital market for
their Series A round. Such issuers are unlikely to risk their reputation, and foreclose their
venture capital access, to exploit the Common Stock Loophole.
The Wefunder SAFE and the Crowd SAFE mostly copy the Y Combinator safe’s
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conversion approach. Each has conversion provisions for equity financings and liquidity
events that are similar to the Y Combinator safe. However, the Wefunder SAFE and the
Crowd SAFE do have some features that warrant discussion.
a. Wefunder SAFE
i. Basic Conversion Feature
With a few exceptions, the Wefunder SAFEs in the Study had identical conversion
features. Because the Wefunder SAFE is modeled after the Y Combinator safe, it converts
upon the occurrence of an “Equity Financing” or a “Liquidity Event.” An “‘Equity
Financing’ means a bona fide transaction or series of transactions with the principal
purpose of raising capital, pursuant to which the Company issues and sells Preferred Stock
at a fixed pre-money valuation.”215 Like the Y Combinator safe, the Wefunder SAFE
includes the Common Stock Loophole. While traditional startups are unlikely to exploit
the loophole, the same may not be true for Regulation CF issuers. It is unclear who
Regulation CF issuers will turn to for their future equity financing rounds. As explained
earlier, venture capital firms may not be interested in these issuers. If Regulation CF
issuers continue to seek capital through Regulation CF offerings, such investors may be
comfortable taking common stock over preferred stock.
If the issuer does sell preferred stock in a priced round, Wefunder SAFEs
automatically convert, although Wefunder SAFEs convert into nonvoting preferred stock.
Like a Y Combinator safe, there is no minimum size threshold for the preferred stock
offering to trigger conversion.
ii. Exceptions
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215. WEFUNDER, WEFUNDER SAFE FOR CORPORATIONS – VALUATION CAP & D ISCOUNT4,
https://wefunder.com/faq/legal-primer (last visted Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter WEFUNDER SAMPLE SAFE] (scroll
down the Legal Primer for Founders page to the Wefunder SAFE: Simple Agreement for Future Equity section
and select the Wefunder SAFE for Corporations - Valuation Cap & Discount document under the Sample
Agreements subheading).
216. See
APP
APP,
INC .,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1776303/000167025419000344/documents_list.htm; DOWNTOD ASH,
INC.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1781213/000167025419000406/documents_list.htm;
STEALTH
MACHINE
CO.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(May
28,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1777610/000167025419000363/documents_list.htm.
217. See
CARIBU
INC .,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(June
14,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1777899/000167025419000395/documents_list.htm.
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A few issuers modified the Wefunder SAFE’s basic conversion feature. Three
issuers’ safes called for an automatic conversion if an Equity Financing occurs. However,
these issuers eliminated the definition for an Equity Financing, making it unclear exactly
what triggers the Equity Financing conversion.216 It is not clear whether eliminating the
“Equity Financing” definition was a conscious decision by the issuer or a mere editing
error.
Additionally, one issuer completely eliminated the Equity Conversion feature,
meaning its safes only convert for a Liquidity Event.217 A “Liquidity Event” is defined as
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a change of control transaction or an IPO.218 This is a significant change from the standard
template and the issuer did not explain the reasoning behind it.
iii. Repurchase Provision to Prevent Section 12(g) Registration
The default Wefunder SAFE does have a unique feature not present in the Y
Combinator safe.219 The Wefunder SAFE gives the issuer a right to repurchase the safe to
prevent registration under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”).220 If the issuer determines, in its sole discretion, that its securities are
likely to be held by enough record holders to require registration under section 12(g), the
issuer can repurchase a safe for the greater of (a) the purchase price or (b) the fair market
value of the safe as determined by an independent appraiser chosen by the issuer. However,
if an equity financing occurs within three months after a safe repurchase and the equity
financing would have generated a better price for the safe holder, the issuer must pay the
difference to the former safe holder.
Exchange Act section 12(g)(1)221 requires issuers with a class of equity securities to
register them under the Exchange Act and become a reporting company if two conditions
are met:
(1) The issuer has more than $10 million in total assets; and
(2) The issuer has a class of equity securities with either (a) more than 2,000
shareholders of record222 or (b) 500 or more shareholders of record who are not
accredited investors.
Becoming a reporting company is extremely expensive, and few companies want to
do so until conducting their IPO. The JOBS Act made it easier to avoid section 12(g)
registration by adding a new paragraph (6) to section 12(g)223 that instructs the SEC to
exempt section 4(a)(6) securities from section 12(g)’s provisions. The SEC implemented
its section 12(g)(6) mandate with Exchange Act Rule 12g-6,224 which provides that
securities issued in a section 4(a)(6) offering are not included in the section 12(g)(1) record
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Sec. 12. Registration Requirements for Securities.
(g) . . .
(6)Exclusion for persons holding certain securities.—The Commission shall, by rule, exempt,
conditionally or unconditionally, securities acquired pursuant to an offering made under section
4[(a)](6) of the Securities Act of 1933 from the provisions of this subsection.
224. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-6.
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218. WEFUNDER SAMPLE SAFE, supra note 215, at 4.
219. Id.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1).
222. Section 12(g)(1) focuses on “shareholders of record” rather than “beneficial owners.” The beneficial
owner is the investor who purchased the security, and the person one typically thinks of as the real owner of the
security. The shareholder of record, in contrast, is the party in whose name the securities are held on the books
of the issuer or its transfer agent. For example, when an investor buys securities through a brokerage firm, most
brokerage firms will hold those securities in street name. Holding Your Securities: Get the Facts, SEC (Mar. 3,
2003), http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/holdsec.htm. This means the brokerage firm will hold the securities in its
name, and not in the name of the investor. Id. Thus, the investor is the beneficial owner of the securities, and the
brokerage firm is the shareholder of record.
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(6) (internal citations omitted).
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holder count if the issuer: (1) is current in filing its Regulation CF annual reports,225 (2)
has total assets not exceeding $25 million; and (3) has engaged an SEC-registered transfer
agent. The rule also includes a two-year transition period for issuers that subsequently
exceed the $25 million total asset threshold.
Because of Rule 12g-6, it is not clear that Regulation CF issuers truly need the
repurchase provision. Since issuers have sole discretion to decide when the provision is
triggered, there is potential for abusing the right. The same holds true for the issuer’s right
to choose the appraiser and only giving safe holders a three-month price guarantee.
b. Crowd SAFE
i. Basic Conversion Feature
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225. An issuer that has sold securities in a Regulation CF offering must file an annual report on Form C-AR
no later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report. 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(b).
226. See The Crowd Safe, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (scroll down the
page for the links to the Crowd SAFE example templates).
227. TWO
SPIRIT
LLC,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C/A)
(Dec.
3,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1754776/000175477618000004/thephluidproject_formca.pdf.
228. BLUE WORLD VOYAGES, LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1741141/000114420419040347/tv527723_ex99.pdf.
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Each of the Crowd SAFEs in the Study had identical conversion features with two
exceptions that are mentioned below. Like Wefunder SAFEs, Crowdfunder SAFEs
convert into nonvoting stock if an “Equity Financing” or “Liquidity Event” occurs.
However, unlike Wefunder SAFEs or Y Combinator safes, Crowd SAFEs include a $1
million minimum size threshold to trigger an equity financing conversion.226 Considering
the average size of the 2019 Republic safe offerings was only $367,447 and only eight of
the thirty-six Crowd SAFE issuers raised more than $500,000 in their offerings, the $1
million threshold could be a significant barrier to conversion. Moreover, one of the issuers
increased the threshold to $3 million227 and another issuer increased the threshold to $15
million.228
The Crowd SAFE appears to eliminate the Common Stock Loophole, but the
instrument’s language does leave some ambiguity. An equity financing conversion is
triggered if the issuer conducts an “Equity Securities” sale that raises at least $1 million.
Equity Securities are defined as common or preferred stock, which would appear to
eliminate the loophole. However, when a Crowd SAFE does convert, it converts into “CF
Shadow Series” shares. CF Shadow Series shares are defined as “Preferred Stock that is
identical in all respects to the shares of Preferred Stock issued in the relevant Equity
Financing.” The CF Shadow Series definition suggests that only a preferred stock deal
would trigger the safe, since safes appear to only convert into preferred stock.
The most distinct Crowd SAFE feature is its “roll-over” feature. If a Crowd SAFE
issuer conducts a qualifying equity financing, it has the option, at its sole discretion, to
immediately convert the safes into stock or postpone the conversion to a later equity
financing (where conversion can be postponed again) or a liquidity event. If a liquidity
event occurs, the safes must be converted. Subsequent conversions are done based on the
stock price from the first equity financing. Republic explains that the purpose of the roll-
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over provision is to allow issuers a clean cap table.
The Crowd SAFE allows all investors in your Republic campaign to be represented as
one line item on your cap table. It helps startups fundraising under Reg CF avoid “messy cap
table” concerns, save legal fees, and reduce the time spent structuring the terms of their
financing.
With the Crowd SAFE, investors only convert at a liquidity event––an acquisition, IPO,
or change of control. Unlike a traditional SAFE, they don’t automatically convert at
subsequent equity financing. This ensures investors are never on the cap table as individuals.
(That is, unless you’d like them to be––we can make that work, too.)229

c. Problems with Conversion Avoidance
The Wefunder SAFE (due to the Common Stock Loophole) and the Crowd SAFE
(due to the minimum-size threshold, the roll-over feature, and possibly the Common Stock
Loophole) allow issuers to avoid conversion. Is that a problem? At first glance, the answer
may seem to be no. In the traditional startup market, few startups pay dividends. That
means investors only receive cash flows when the startup achieves a liquidity event (sale
of the company or IPO), at which point the investors can sell their stock for cash. Since
conversion avoidance is not possible when a liquidity event occurs, investors do not appear
to be harmed.
However, in their 2016 essay, Green and Coyle envision a scenario where safe
investors could be harmed by conversion avoidance.

229. The Crowd Safe: Clean Cap Table, REPUBLIC , https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
230. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 177–78.
231. The dividend would make the issuer a less attractive acquisition candidate, since it would have fewer
assets, but that could be addressed by lowering the acquisition price to match the dividend payment.
232. “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
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This article posits another harmful dividend scenario. The issuer could avoid
conversion until reaching a liquidity event—most likely a sale of the company. Shortly
before the sale is consummated and conversion takes place, the issuer could declare a
dividend and distribute a portion of its residual to its existing shareholder base.231 The safe
investors would not be entitled to that dividend, since they are not shareholders. Moreover,
the issuer board’s ability to declare the dividend would not be blocked by fiduciary duty
concerns since, once again, the safe holders are not shareholders. A pre-sale dividend could
possibly violate the issuer’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.232 However,
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Imagine a . . . company that raises capital in a crowdfunding offering using a SAFE. The
company uses that capital to launch a product or service, which starts generating significant
cash flow before the company needs additional capital. The company is able to use that cash
flow to obtain bank financing and may even have profits to reinvest in growing the business.
At some point, that company may also have sufficiently healthy profits to start distributing
those profits to its owners (the founders). This business, following a path that is extremely
common—perhaps the norm—for non-tech startups and small businesses, could continue in
this fashion in perpetuity without ever needing additional equity capital or needing to sell. If
that were to happen, the SAFE holders would continue to hold their securities, earning no
interest, receiving no dividends and never seeing any return of their original investment. We
call this the “dividend problem.”230
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the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not well defined and would require a court to
analyze the specific facts and circumstances of the dividend. Clearly prohibiting pre-sale
dividends would be a better approach for safe investors.
d. Discounts and Valuation Caps
The Study also raised concerns about the discounts and valuation caps employed by
issuers. Wefunder SAFEs and Crowd SAFEs generally included both features, with
investors using whichever is more favorable for them.233 Recall that discounts and
valuation caps are meant to compensate investors for the additional risk they incur by
investing before the priced round. The discount and/or valuation cap is the risk premium
the issuer must pay to raise earlier-stage dollars. Riskier issuers—which includes issuers
that are less likely to conduct a future qualified offering—should pay higher discounts and
have lower valuation caps. However, the Study found that the discounts on the safe deals
were generally low to nonexistent while the valuation caps were frequently very high (see
Table 10). Discounts ranged from zero percent (in nineteen of the seventy-one deals) to
thirty percent (in one deal) with an average discount rate of 13.1 percent. Regarding the
valuation caps, fourteen of the deals had either no cap or a cap of $20 million or more. The
highest valuation cap was $70 million, and the average cap was $11.6 million.

2. Convertible Notes
There were twenty-two convertible note deals in the Study, fifteen of which were
conducted through Wefunder and seven through StartEngine. There was less uniformity
among the convertible note deals than the safe deals.
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enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Comment d to section
205 explains that “evasion of the spirit of the bargain” is bad faith behavior that violates the duty. Id.
233. A few deals allowed early-bird investors to benefit from both the discount and the valuation cap.
234. Some of the issuers offered more favorable discount rates or valuation caps to early-bird investors. Table
10 does not account for any early-bird incentives.
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Table 10
Discounts and valuation caps for the safe issuers234
Discount Rate
Number of
Valuation Caps
Number
Issuers
of Issuers
No discount
19
No valuation cap
4
10%
10
$40 million and above
3
12%
1
$20 million to below $40 million
7
15%
4
$10 million to below $20 million
15
20%
32
$5 million to below $10 million
35
22%
1
Below $5 million
7
25%
2
Average valuation cap was $11.6 million
30%
1
Average discount was 13.1 percent
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a. Conversions
Like classic convertible notes, the convertible notes in the Study generally convert
to preferred stock (or a shadow stock that resembles the issued securities but with
modifications such as no voting rights) if the issuer (a) conducts a qualified equity
financing (referred to as a “Qualified Financing” in the notes) or (b) experiences a change
of control. However, two of the notes did not include Qualified Financing conversion
provisions and only convert if a change of control occurs.
Of the twenty notes with a Qualified Financing conversion provision, they generally
defined a Qualified Financing as a transaction, or series of transactions, in which the issuer
raises a stated cash threshold from a sale of the issuer’s capital stock. This means there are
two key variables to define: (a) the size threshold; and (b) what qualifies as capital stock.
One of the twenty notes did not include a size threshold. The other nineteen notes included
size thresholds ranging from $250,000 to $7 million, with six of the notes including size
thresholds above $1 million (see Table 11). Higher size thresholds make it easier for
issuers to avoid conversion.
Table 11
Size thresholds for the convertible notes
Size threshold to be a Qualified Financing
No size threshold
Up to $500,000
Above $500,000 and up to $1 million
Above $1 million and up to $2 million
Above $2 million and up to $3 million
Above $3 million

Number of Issuers
1
2
11
3
2
1

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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The convertible notes could define the issuer’s subsequent capital stock offering as
including any equity securities (common or preferred), preferred stock only, or common
stock only. If the option is limited, the issuer has the ability to avoid conversion by issuing
a form of stock that does not trigger the Qualified Financing definition. Of the twenty notes
with a Qualified Financing conversion provision, ten defined a Qualified Financing as
including any equity securities. However, several of those notes went on to state the notes
convert into the preferred stock issued in the triggering financing, creating ambiguity as to
whether a Qualified Financing is actually limited solely to preferred stock.
As with safes, conversion avoidance is problematic for convertible notes, but the
problem is different. The main problem for convertible notes stems from what happens if
the notes reach maturity without converting. Because the interest rate on a convertible note
is typically low (see Table 12), issuers may wish to avoid conversion and simply pay off
the loan when it matures. Considering that convertible notes are unsecured, low-interest
loans, repaying the loan could be the most profitable strategy for many Regulation CF
issuers.
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Table 12
Interest rates for the convertible notes
Interest Rate
Number of Issuers
2%
2
3%
2
4%
2
5%
4
6%
9
8%
2
12%
1
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235. See ELEMENT FARMS , INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759704/000167025418000574/documents_list.htm;
H OMEFREE,
LLC,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C/A)
(Apr.
18,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1755119/000167025419000226/documents_list.htm;
PHENOMIX
SCIS.
LLC,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(Nov.
9,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1757804/000167025418000530/documents_list.htm; SFO84, INC .
(MISTERB&B ),
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C/A)
(Apr.
19,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759313/000167025419000243/documents_list.htm; C OOKIE DEP’T,
INC.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C/A)
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1748804/000167025418000603/documents_list.htm; W ISE POWER
INC.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C/A)
(Aug.
30,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1741500/000166516018000869/wise_offeringscreen.pdf.
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In the traditional startup market, issuers generally do not have an incentive to reach
maturity without converting. These issuers want to cooperate with the venture capital
community, raise a priced venture capital round, and reap the benefits of being a venture
capital-backed company. If these issuers reach maturity without converting, it is because
things have gone wrong. Just as safe issuers in the traditional startup market are unlikely
to risk their reputation to avoid safe conversions, it is unlikely that note issuers in the
traditional startup market would risk their reputation in the venture capital community to
get a low interest loan. Moreover, convertible notes in the traditional setting often give
note holders the option upon reaching maturity of (a) demanding immediate repayment or
(b) converting the note into equity at a pre-set conversion rate that is likely to be beneficial
to the note holders. If an issuer strategically sought to avoid conversion and repay the notes
at maturity, the note holders could refuse payment and convert their notes to stock at the
favorable pre-set rate.
In the Regulation CF market, the incentives for issuers to avoid conversion and treat
the convertible notes as low interest loans are less clear. First, reputation is unlikely to play
the same enforcement role in the Regulation CF market. Most Regulation CF issuers are
likely to be outsiders to the venture capital market, which is why they are raising
Regulation CF capital in the first place, so they may be more willing to risk their reputation
for a low interest loan. Second, most of the notes in the Study make it easy for issuers to
treat the instruments as low interest loans. Six of the notes simply require the issuer to pay
the principal and interest if the note reaches maturity. 235 The other notes either
automatically convert to stock at maturity or give note holders the option to convert. The
conversion rate is typically based on the note’s valuation cap or discount rate. Because the
valuation caps in the Study were generally high and the discount rates low (discussed
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below), the conversion option may provide note holders little solace.
b. Prepayments
As a general rule, convertible notes should prohibit issuers from prepaying the loan.
It is the same issue as the conversion avoidance problem. If prepayments are allowed,
issuers can strategically repay the notes before an attractive conversion event occurs.
Rather than share the company’s free cash flows with more shareholders, the issuer can
simply prepay the low interest loan. Five of the notes in the Study give issuers the right to
prepay the notes at any time,236 while four of the notes give issuers the right to prepay the
notes in advance of a change of control transaction.237 This author was very surprised to
see broad prepayment rights in any of the notes, let alone forty percent of them!
One of the notes prohibited prepayment and two of the notes were silent regarding
prepayment, which probably means those issuers lack a prepayment right.238 The
remaining ten notes only allow prepayment if the holders consent.
c. Discounts and Valuation Caps
Finally, the same concerns about low discounts and high valuation caps that applied
to the Regulation CF safes apply equally to the convertible notes in the Study (see Table
13). The convertible note discounts ranged from zero percent to twenty percent with an
average discount of 15.2 percent, while valuation caps ranged from $1.9 million to $40
million with an average valuation cap of $9.7 million.
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236. See
BOON,
INC .,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1774003/000167025419000368/documents_list.htm; HAWAIIAN OLA
BREWING
CORP.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674519/000167025418000555/documents_list.htm; SFO84, INC .
(MISTERB&B ), OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A), supra note 235; SMARTGURLZ US INC , OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(May
6,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737125/000167025419000326/documents_list.htm; VERIGLIF INC.,
OFFERING
STATEMENT
(FORM
C)
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1774921/000167025419000339/documents_list.htm.
237. DUN RITE GAMES, INC , OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1748769/000167025418000377/documents_list.htm;
ELEMENT
FARMS, INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C), supra note 235; HOMEFREE, LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM
C/A), supra note 235; PHENOMIX SCIS. LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C), supra note 235.
238. John N. Oest, Negotiating the Loan Commitment: The Borrower’s Perspective, ABA: B US. L. TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2010/01/09_oest/.
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Table 13
Discounts and valuation caps for the convertible note issuers
Discount Rates
Number of
Valuation Caps
Number
Issuers
of Issuers
No discount rate
1
$30 million and above
2
5%
1
$20 million to below $30 million
0
7.5%
1
$10 million to below $20 million
5
10%
3
$5 million to below $10 million
9
15%
5
Below $5 million
6
17.5%
1
20%
10
Average discount was 15.2 percent Average valuation cap was $9.7 million
C. Next Steps?
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What should be done about the Regulation CF deferred-equity market? As explained
earlier, valuation deferral does not change investors’ ultimate goal of purchasing valuable
future cash flows. It just changes the process for identifying and measuring the future cash
flows, which ideally looks like this:
x A priced equity round triggers an automatic conversion;
x The deferred-equity investors’ future cash flows come from an exit event—
most likely a sale of the company—that takes place after the priced equity
round; and
x High-quality investors in the priced equity round value the future cash flows
from a projected exit event, with the deferred-equity investors taking that price
(adjusted by a discount or valuation cap that compensates them for their
additional risk).
Valuation deferral works in the traditional startup market because the investors in
the priced equity round tend to be venture capital firms that can thoughtfully value the
future cash flows for the more-mature startup. Additionally, the classic deferred-equity
instruments are generally pro-investor contracts that thoughtfully account for the risk that
comes with these investments.
The Study raises substantial concerns about the process for identifying/measuring
future cash flows for deferred-equity instruments in the Regulation CF market. The issuers
appear unlikely to ever raise capital from venture capital firms, which eliminates (a) the
baseline conversion event and (b) the sophisticated investors who can be counted on to
thoughtfully value the issuer’s future cash flows. That problem alone makes the Regulation
CF deferred-equity market highly questionable. It lowers the probability of the instruments
ever producing cash flows for investors. And if a conversion does occur, it lowers the
probability of the subsequent investors accurately measuring the future cash flows.
Assuming some thoughtful investors can get over this major problem, they should receive
very investor-friendly instruments to account for this additional risk by providing investors
with more upside potential and more downside protection. Despite the instruments’
abundant risk, the Study shows that Regulation CF issuers consistently obtain investment
terms from investors that are extremely issuer-friendly and that increase the investors’ risk
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exposure.
To address the problem, this article recommends that the SEC or FINRA impose a
suitability duty on funding portals that host Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings.239
This suitability duty could be similar to the one that brokers typically owe customers but
adapted to the Regulation CF setting. The standard broker suitability duty is captured in
FINRA240 Rule 2111.241 FINRA offers the following description:
FINRA Rule 2111 requires that a firm or associated person have a reasonable basis to
believe a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities
is suitable for the customer. This is based on the information obtained through reasonable
diligence of the firm or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile. . . .
...
Brokers must have a firm understanding of both the product and the customer, according
to Rule 2111. The lack of such an understanding itself violates the suitability rule. 242

The duty is intended to prevent broker’s from pushing inappropriate investments on
vulnerable investors. The broker must (a) know the customer (“customer-specific
suitability”) and (b) know the investment so the broker can have a reasonable basis for
believing it is suitable for that customer (the “reasonable basis” obligation).243 Both tasks
require the broker use reasonable diligence. For example, it would be unsuitable for a
broker to recommend a speculative investment with a substantial risk of principal erosion
to an eighty-five-year-old widow(er) with limited funds for retirement. It would also be
unsuitable for a broker to recommend to anyone investments that are designed to fail.244
The suitability duty would require some adaption for funding portals. Funding
portals are a new form of securities intermediary introduced by the JOBS Act and
Regulation CF to facilitate Regulation CF transactions. Regulation CF transactions must
be conducted through either a broker or a funding portal.245 Republic,246 StartEngine, and
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239. In their 2016 essay, Green and Coyle considered the idea of a suitability duty for funding portals when
offering safes. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 180–81 n.36.
240. FINRA is not a governmental organization. It is a national securities association that is registered with
the SEC per Exchange Act section 15A. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. However, brokers fall under the jurisdiction of
FINRA because Exchange Act section 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8), mandates that registered brokers become
members of FINRA, subject to limited exemptions set forth in Exchange Act Rule 15b9-1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b91.
241. Rule 2111, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 (last visited Feb.
22, 2020).
242. Suitability, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/suitability (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
243. FINRA describes the suitability duty as having three components: (a) reasonable basis suitability; (b)
customer-specific suitability; and (3) quantitative suitability. Id. “Quantitative suitability requires a broker with
actual or de facto control over a customer’s account to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of
recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, is not excessive and unsuitable for the
customer when taken together in light of the customer’s investment profile.” Id.
244. Rule 2111, supra note 241, at Supplementary Material .05(a).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C). Brokers are the standard intermediary for securities transactions. Exchange Act
section 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), defines a broker as any person (including legal entities), other than a bank,
that is “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” Brokers are
heavily regulated entities that must register with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1), and become members of
FINRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8). Due to concerns about brokers’ heavy regulatory burden, funding portals were
introduced as an additional securities intermediary. Funding portals may not engage in all the activities a broker
may engage in, but they are also less-heavily regulated.
246. Its legal name is OpenDeal Portal LLC.
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247. Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020). The FINRA list includes OpenDeal Portal LLC (which operates under the name
“Republic”), StartEngine Capital LLC, and Wefunder Portal LLC.
248. Dealers are defined in Exchange Act section 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5), generally as any person, other
than a bank, who is in the business of buying and selling securities for her own account as part of a regular
business.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80). Due to a typographical error, there are two Exchange Act sections 3(a)(80). One
defines “emerging growth companies” and one defines “funding portals.”
250. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(a).
251. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b).
252. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1).
253. If brokers established Regulation CF platforms, the same duty would apply to them.
254. See,
e.g.,
Rule
2310(b)(2),
FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8469 (last visited Feb. 22,
2020) (establishing additional suitability standards for direct participation programs); Rule 2360(b)(19), FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6306 (last visited Feb. 22,
2020) (establishing additional suitability standards for options); Rule 2370(b)(19), FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6309 (last visited Feb. 22,
2020) (establishing additional suitability standards for security futures).
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Wefunder are all funding portals.247
FINRA’s Rule 2111 does not apply to funding portals. It only applies to brokers and
dealers.248 Despite performing some broker-like functions, funding portals are not
brokers. Moreover, Exchange Act section 3(a)(80)249 and Regulation CF Rule 402(a)250
prohibit funding portals from offering investment advice or recommendations, which are
the triggers for the Rule 2111 suitability duty. While prohibited from advising or
recommending, Regulation CF Rule 402(b) contains a safe harbor permitting funding
portals to engage in certain similar activities.251 Most importantly for this article’s
recommendation, Rule 402(b)(1) allows funding portals to “[d]etermine whether and
under what terms to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities in reliance on section 4(a)(6)
of the Securities Act . . . through its platform . . . .”252 The SEC could expand Rule 402(b)
to make pre-clearing deferred-equity issuers mandatory, rather than permissible. FINRA
could then impose a suitability duty on funding portals253 relating to this mandatory
preclearance obligation. Like brokers, funding portals are FINRA members and subject to
its rule-making authority.
FINRA has experience tailoring suitability obligations to specific investment types,
so this should not be a burdensome task for FINRA. FINRA Rule 2111 sets forth the
general suitability duty. However, for certain more complex instruments, such as direct
participation programs, options, and futures, FINRA has developed additional suitability
requirements that brokers must satisfy.254 For Regulation CF deferred-equity instruments,
this author suggests the suitability duty focus primarily on the reasonable basis obligation,
rather than the customer-specific suitability component. The problem is not that funding
portals are hosting high-risk investments that some of its customers may not understand.
The problem is that many of the Regulation CF deferred-equity instruments are poorly
designed and offer no investor, regardless of sophistication, much chance for success.
x The instruments are designed to generate positive results from a subsequent
equity financing led by sophisticated investors who can properly value the
issuer. The entire valuation deferral mechanism depends on that subsequent
equity financing priced by sophisticated investors. Yet, most of the issuers
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appear unlikely to ever accomplish such an offering.
x Most of the instruments allow issuers an unacceptably broad ability to avoid
conversion, which can be exploited by issuers.
x Some of the convertible notes are essentially high-risk, low-reward
instruments. They are low-reward instruments due to conversion avoidance
features and/or prepayment rights that may limit their reward to that of a lowinterest, unsecured loan, but with far more risk.
To allow issuers to sell deferred-equity instruments through their platforms, funding
portals would need to have a reasonable basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence,
that such instruments are suitable for at least some investors. Reasonable diligence would
need to provide the funding portals with an understanding of the potential risks and
rewards of the instruments.255 It is not clear that all of the current batch of Regulation CF
deferred-equity instruments would pass that standard.
A suitability duty would also help to correct a conflict of interest that currently
plagues the Regulation CF market. Because issuers are the ones paying the funding portals,
the portals’ first loyalty is likely to their issuers. It should come as no surprise that Republic
and Wefunder, whose businesses depend substantially on deferred-equity issuers,256 have
developed very issuer-friendly deferred-equity instruments that they actively market to
issuers and investors. In addition to forcing funding portals to eliminate the worst-designed
instruments, a suitability duty would reduce the conflict of interest by requiring funding
portals to give due consideration to investors’ interests before allowing deferred-equity
instruments to sell through their platforms.
V. CONCLUSION

C M
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255. This suggestion is based on Supplemental Material .05(a) to Rule 2111, which explains:
The reasonable-basis obligation requires a member or associated person to have a reasonable
basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for at
least some investors. In general, what constitutes reasonable diligence will vary depending on,
among other things, the complexity of and risks associated with the security or investment
strategy and the member’s or associated person’s familiarity with the security or investment
strategy. A member’s or associated person’s reasonable diligence must provide the member or
associated person with an understanding of the potential risks and rewards associated with the
recommended security or strategy. The lack of such an understanding when recommending a
security or strategy violates the suitability rule.
Rule 2111, supra note 241, at Supplementary Material .05(a).
256. During the Study’s time period:
x
Thirty-six of the forty deals (or ninety percent) funded through Republic were safes.
x
Fifty of the eighty-four deals (or sixty percent) funded through Wefunder were safes or convertible
notes.
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In a well-functioning market, reasonable investors are less likely to invest in
companies when they cannot confidently value the opportunity, which reduces vital
fundraising for young startups. Deferred-equity instruments offer a partial solution by
allowing Specialized Startup Investors to thoughtfully invest in venture capital-eligible
young startups without valuing them at the time of investment. They provide a contractual
solution to an otherwise intractable problem. Rather than directly value the expected cash
flows that come from investing in a young startup, deferred-equity instruments allow a
future equity financing—that is priced by highly sophisticated investors, such as venture
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capital firms—value the cash flows. The deferred-equity investors then take the price set
by the sophisticated investors (adjusted for any discount or valuation cap). The investment
decision for deferred-equity investors is thus changed from projecting the young startup’s
future profits/cash flows and accounting for their uncertainty (which are unavoidably
difficult tasks when the young startup has no meaningful operating history) to predicting
whether the startup will conduct a future, high-quality stock offering (which should be
manageable for Specialized Startup Investors). Deferred-equity instruments have become
an important financing tool for the traditional startup market and have positively
contributed to the United States’ seed financing explosion over the last decade.
If the story ended there, deferred-equity instruments would be a resounding success.
However, their spread to the Regulation CF market does not appear to be positive. This
article’s examination of the deferred-equity deals funded through the Republic,
StartEngine, and Wefunder portals during 2019 paints a picture of improper risk transfers
to unsophisticated public investors. To address the problem, this article recommends that
the SEC or FINRA impose a suitability duty on funding portals that host Regulation CF
deferred-equity offerings. It is important to note that crowdfunding remains a relatively
new phenomenon. Regulation CF issuers and offerings may look very different in a few
years. For example, Regulation CF issuers could develop a more integrated relationship
with the venture capital community. This article’s strong criticism of the current
Regulation CF deferred-equity market could look outdated in a few years. An advantage
of the proposed suitability solution is its adaptability. If future Regulation CF offerings
involve issuers with meaningful opportunities to raise venture capital and more investorfriendly terms, a suitability duty would not be an obstacle.
Finally, this article closes with a message to policymakers outside the United States.
Finding seed funding solutions for young startups is a critical matter for policymakers
around the world, not just the United States. The lessons from this article apply to any
country with a meaningful startup market. Deferred-equity instruments are an important
financing tool when used by Specialized Startup Investors to invest in young startups that
are eligible for future equity financings involving highly sophisticated investors. However,
they are also a dangerous tool when used by young startups to raise capital from the general
public. Deferred equity’s positive role in a traditional startup market should not lead to
lenient regulation in a crowdfunding setting. And their negative role in a crowdfunding
setting should not lead to greater regulation in a traditional startup market.
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